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DECISION CASE STUDY 
UNITED KINGDOM 
MOSSMORRAN-BRAEFOOT BAY 
Sally M. Macgill 
Economic, environmental and safety considerations inevitably arise 
in siting decisions for any large scale energy, chemical handling or pro- 
duction facility. T h s  report represents a review of selected aspects of 
the decision and approval process involved in the siting of liquefied 
energy gas facilities a t  Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay in Fife, Scotland. 
Consideration is given to the potential hazard (health and safety), 
environmental and economic impacts of these facilities, as perceived by 
the different parties involved in the decision process, against a back- 
ground of the statutory decision procedures that  were followed in obtain- 
ing official approval of the developments. Public participation will be of 
particular interest. Since this was stimulated largely by the potential 
health and safety impacts, these will be given particular emphasis, not so 
much as issues in their own right but more in terms of the legitimacy of 
the mechanisms through which they were addressed at  various stages in 
the decision process. 
The period under consideration in t h s  report covers the three years 
between July 1976, when initial interest in a site a t  Mossmorran-Braefoot 
Bay was expressed, until August 1979, when approval of applications for 
gas facilities on this site was officially announced. The facilities are 
required in connection with oil and gas production from the UK sector of 
the North Sea, and the site chosen, on a relatively unspoiled stretch of 
the Forth Estuary, meant that  the decision itself would impose a judg- 
ment over a number of classic conflicts: health and safety costs and 
economic benefits; local losses against national and regional benefits; 
differences in party self-interests between and within sections of the pub- 
lic, public authorities and private industries. An indication of the main 
course of events during the decision period will set the bearings for the 
story which unfolds in the remainder of the report. 
The starting point is taken as July 1976 because although formal 
planning applications were not lodged until January-March of the following 
year, there was a phase of considerable informal consultation during the 
latter half of 1976. The lodging of formal planning applications early in 
1977 activated the main official decision machinery: publicity by the host 
local authorities, notification to hlgher tiers of government, and expert 
consultation on potential impacts. A public inquiry (June-July 1977) was 
to become the centerpiece of the decision process--the main vehicle of 
public participation, and forum for arguments for and against the plan- 
ning applications to be openly articulated. An official decision based on 
the Inquiry proceedings and any other relevant considerations had been 
anticipated from the Secretary of State towards the end of 1977, but was 
not to be announced for another eighteen months. The unusual and quite 
unexpected delay was due to a source of hitherto overlooked potential 
hazard--electro-magne tic break sparks from radio transmissions--whose 
lengthy consideration raises issues of rather greater procedural signifi- 
cance than the substance of the sparks issue itself. 
The decision of approval announced in August 1979 was underpinned 
by support from both local and national government, wh.ch had been evi- 
dent from the earliest stages, but bitter resentment from an  extremely 
articulate and well organized local public interest group, fearful of the 
safety of their homes and livelihoods in the face of the hazard potential of 
the proposed installations and their associated activities. Their campaign 
opened the decision process to wider examination, and external observa- 
tion of it is instructive because it coincided with a major shift in official 
handling of planning applications for hazardous installations in the UK. 
Because of its position as something of a landmark in this field, some of 
the grievances and fears expressed by sections of the public are unlikely 
to find repetition in subsequent decisions. The campaign as  a whole is 
nevertheless worth detailed review as an  essential component of a learn- 
ing process in the  handling of decisions on hazardous activity. 
The case study illustrates problems which are fascinating for their 
complexity and defiance of satisfactory solution. Unequal distribution of 
costs and benefits and. illusive notions of Pareto optlmality; the righ.ts of 
industry to operate without undue interference from others, and of t.he 
public to exist without fear of undue imposition by industry; the trad.e-off 
between decision taking and decision postponement in the face of a never 
stationary frontier of knowledge and experience in an area of high poten- 
tial risk; the very different perceptions of risk acceptability by various 
individuals and organizations; the extent to which acceptable risk can and 
should be seen to be achieved through publicly acknowledged safety scru- 
tiny during a decision process; the standing of minority interests, in par- 
ticular problems of "accountability" which arise when a population con- 
sidering itself a t  most risk is too small in number for normal democratic 
representation; and the single issue nature of their concern arguably 
unsuited to representation by existing democratic means. 
1.2. STATUS OF REPORT 
Thts report* has been prepared in connection with a research project 
a t  IIASA designed to analyze and to compare the decision procedures fol- 
lowed in different countries for the siting of liquefied energy gas installa- 
tions. Four liquefied energy gas facilities worldwide were identified for 
detailed case study, including Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay in the UK; other 
sites are in the USA, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (FRG). There are a number of features that distinguish the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay developments from these others, including the 
following: 
(1) The substances to be handled at  the Mossmorran installations 
are LPG's and not LNG; individual hazard properties are dif- 
ferent and may lead to a different evaluation of hazard conse- 
quence. 
(2) The installations will represent export rather  than import facili- 
ties for their host country. 
(3) The LPG facilities involved were considered withtn the decision 
and approval process as part of a larger package of petro- 
chemical developments, involving an ethylene cracker and pos- 
sible downstream industries at  the same sites. The decision pro- 
cess for the LPG facilities alone cannot be easily separated from 
the package as a whole; the main objectors to the decision, 
moreover, emphasized that they regarded ethylene to be the 
most hazardous of the substances involved. 
(4) Site screening was undertaken by Shell and Esso, so that from 
the perspectives of all other parties, Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay 
can be considered as a one-site decision process. 
( 5 )  The decision and participatory procedures involved are UK- 
specific. 
(6) Processing as well as storage and transshtpment facilities are 
involved. 
(7) The installations are currently under construction. 
*A surnmary report of this casestudy has also been prepared (Macgill 1982). 
1.3. OUTLINE 
The structure of the present report was designed in broad terms to 
match that of other case-study reports being prepared for the IIASA pro- 
ject; choice of aspects given emphasis below was conditioned accordingly. 
The scope of each chapter is as follows. 
Chapter 2: a description of the context for the decision and the main 
elements of the process. This includes a summary of the nature of the 
development, in particular its association with oil and gas production 
from the Brent field (section 2.1.), a review of the choice of the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay site (section 2.2.),  a description of the main 
parties to the decision (section 2.3.), and the main events in and dynam- 
ics of the decision process (section 2.4.). 
Chapters 3 and 4: an analysis of the decision problem itself. Four 
main issues dominated--the national interest, local socio-economic bene- 
fits, health and safety aspects and environmental impacts. These are dis- 
cussed in turn in Chapter 3. The various parties involved--the oil com- 
panie s, different tiers of local and national government, statutory advi- 
sors, private consultants, public interest groups, and key individuals, had 
varying perspectives on these issues and varying levels of information and 
expertise from which to judge them. Conflicts arose which required reso- 
lution or judgment in the final decision. 
Chapters 5 and 6: an analysis of the decision procedure that was fol- 
lowed. In Chapter 5 the normal statutory procedures for processing plan- 
ning applications are described, and the evolution of the Mossmorran- 
Braefoot Bay decision process in relation to them is reviewed. This 
highlights the opportunities available for public participation, the scope 
for the use of formal and informal analyses for various issues, and the 
hierarchical interrelationship between parties. I t  leads ultimately to the 
final decision, and its official justification. Party perspectives on pro- 
cedural aspects (considered in Chapter 6) are important as these shed 
light on the legitimacy of a decision procedu.re in which important issues 
of safety, and national and local economics were raised. 
Chapter 7: in thls final chapter, a preliminary evaluation of selected 
aspects of the decision process as a whole is offered. Specific attention is 
given to the treatment of the health and safety dimension, and to public 
participation. 
C r n E R  2: 
THE DECISION STRUCTURE 
2.1. CONTEXT FOR THE DENELOPMENTS 
The terms of reference of the decision process to be considered were 
for the international oil companies Shell and Esso to obtain outline plan- 
ning permission (i. e . ,  official approval in principle) for the following appli- 
cations: 
(a)  an application dated 19 January 1977 by Shell UK Exploration 
and Production Ltd for the construction of a natbral gas liquids 
separation plant a t  Mossmorran and associated jetty a t  Braefoot 
Bay, together with facilities for the storage, transmission, load- 
mg and shpment  of separated products; 
(b) an application dated 23 February 1977 by Esso Chemical Limited 
for the construction of an ethylene cracker a t  Mossmorran and 
associated jetty a t  Braefoot Bay, together with facilities for the 
transn~ission, storage, loading and shpment  of ethylene pro- 
duct; and 
(c)  an application dated 21 March 1977 by Esso Chemical Limited 
for industrial development on an area extending to approxi- 
mately 175 hectares at Mossmorran. 
It was also necessary to establish suitable planning conditions in the 
event of approval being granted. 
The facilities would represent the first major new downstream pro- 
cessing plant to be associated with North Sea exploration; hitherto 
onshore activity has concentrated on platform construction, servicing, oil 
refining and gas treatment. The facilities are to be built in connection 
with the exploitation of the Brent oil and gas field in the UK sector of the 
North Sea. Brent is the biggest oil field in the UK sector, and has an 
abnormally high gas content (estimated recoverable reserves 1685 x lo6 
barrels crude oil, 530 x lo6 natural gas liquids 3.5 trillion cubic feet 
methane, Shell 1980). The field is managed by Shell, and Shell and Esso 
each have a 50:50 share in all recoverable output. Commercial oil pro- 
duction began in 1976; gas in commercial quantities was expected to be 
available in 1980. 
The crude oil from Brent is piped to Sullom Voe (Shetland), the gas 
(methane and natural gas liquids) is to be piped to St .  Fergus where the 
methane will be separated and sold under statutory obligation to the Brit- 
ish Gas Corporation. (The Brent-St. Fergus pipeline was completed in 
1980, the St. Fergus terminal is expected to be completed late 1981.) The 
natural gas liquids (NGL's) are the intended feedstocks for the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay facilities. 
As indicated from the fact that  three applications were involved, the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay facilities comprise three separate develop- 
ments. The NGL plant (application (a)) is required in order to separate 
the NGL's into commercial fuels and feedstocks ethane, propane, butane 
and natural gasoline. ,The ethylene cracker (application (b)) is intended 
to manufacture ethylene from ethane, ethylene being one of the basic 
building blocks of the petro-chemical industry. Application (c) relates to 
downstream industrial development that may be attracted to Mossmor- 
ran, given the location there of the ethylene plant. Strictly speaking, the 
NGL plant is the only one of the three that  can be labeled an LEG facility. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 indicate the location, capacities and interrelation- 
s h p s  of the plants. 
It is appropriate to rank the three applications relevant to 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Ray according to the likelihood that each would 
actually be built. A facility for which planning permission is obtained will 
not necessarily be built in practice and indeed varying degrees of uncer- 
tainty about actually building the irlstallations outlined in each 'of the 
three applications was openly acknowledged during t.he decision process. 
I t  was generally appreciated from the start  that Shell (who lodged 
application (a)) were committed to  building the NGL plant. However, Esso 
(who lodged application (b)) were not to make a definite commitment to 
the ethylene cracker until October 1980. Thus, throughout the decision 
process (July 1976-August 1979) the ethylene cracker had to be con- 
sidered as a possible rather than definite development, and as noted 
below, different parties made very different evaluations of t h s  position. 
Application (c) was less certain still, not only because of uncertainty sur- 
rounding application (b), but also because actual development would be 
left to other industrial concerns. Clearly application (c) depends on (b), 
and (b) in turn on (a). However, (a) is not. dependent on (b) or (c) ,  and 
indeed, Shell stated that they wou1.d proceed with the NGL plant (applica- 
tion (a)) even if there was not to be an  ethane cracker. 
Ths  hierarchy of uncertainty is important because it severely com- 
plicated party appraisal of the developments as a whole. Ths  is because 
downstream industries are considerably more labor intensive than basic 
NGL and ethylene plants (see Table 2.1), and therefore, potentially boost 
the employment benefits of the whole package. However, the absence of 
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Table 2.1. Indicative employment implication of the three main types of 
petro-chemical plants (Fife 1977) 
Status of Plant 
Secondary or Polyethylene Low or high 1 
Intermediate density 
polyethylene 
Primary or Basic 
Consumer or 
finished goods 
Example of Plant 
Paint, plastics 
man-made fibres 
Ngl plant 
~ t h y l e n e  Cracker 
firm commitment to  such downstream industry severely frustrated 
assessment of overall economic benefit. 
Products 
1 Pg. 
Ethylene 
The life of the Mossmorran plant was expected to be about 20 years. 
Not all the raw feedstock required would necessarily come from currently 
discovered Brent reserves; future discoveries and further NGL's from 
future North Sea gathering pipeline developments might also prove 
important. 
Alternative (sub optimal) outlets for the NGL's from Brent, in the 
absence of facilities such as those planned for Mossmorran, are use as a 
power .station fuel or  possible use a t  the Grangemouth Petrochemical 
complex. Flaring would be the least attractive option. In the short term, 
until the St.  Fergus terminal is commissioned, Brent gas will be rein- 
jected. 
Most of Shell's share (50%) of the propane and butane output of the 
NGL plant was intend-ed for North American markets. The destination of 
Esso's share of the propane and butane was less definite, but was 
expected to be in European markets or absorbed a t  F'awley. In the 
absence of the ethylene cracker a t  Mossmorran, ethane could be used 
(sub-optimally) elsewhere in the UK putro-chemical industry or as an 
industrial fuel. The ethylene produced by the Mossmorran cracker is all 
intended for. export, unless or until application (c) for further down- 
stream manufacture is taken up. 
Employment 
Density 
(persons/hectare) 
A final development which deserves mention alongside the three 
applications summarized above is the application for the raw NGL 
feedstock pipeline required to link St. Fergus with Mossmorran. This is 
the subject of a separate planning decision, whch  has not yet been 
taken--a different set  of planning regulations (The Pipelines Act admin- 
istered through the Department of Energy) is involved for long distance 
pipelines. It may seem unnatural that what is essentially a single package 
(installations with their associated feedstock pipeline) is separated in this 
way. Although the pipeline may be considerably quicker to build, it might 
be argued that  the decision for the installations effectively pre-empts the 
decision for the pipeline. On the other hand, it could be argued that lack 
of approval of (successful objection to) the pipeline would provide 
grounds for abandonment of the installations. 
2.2. SlTE CHOICE 
As already remarked, the Mossrnorran-Braefoot Bay case study will 
be treated essentially as a one-site decision process. The overriding 
question defining the overall terms of reference of the decision process 
was "Is Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, in principle, a suitable site for the facil- 
ities proposed?" A related question, by way of qualifying any positive 
response to this question is, "What planning conditions need to be stipu- 
lated in relation to the use of t h s  site for the LEG facilities proposed?" In 
the case of a negative response to the first question, an alternative site 
would be sought and a correspond.ing, but essentially separate decision 
process wculd be se t  in train. In contrast to statutory procedures in 
other countries, alternative sites would thus be considered sequentially 
rather than simultaneously, and it is for t h s  reason that the label "one- 
site decision process" is considered appropriate. 
Official decision procedures in Scotland (as in the rest of the UK) are 
set in train when a planning application for the development of an activity 
on a particular site is lodged. For a development of the scale of 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay there are likely to be a number of informal 
consultations wi.th local, regional, and national authorities in advance of 
the lodging of the official planning application, but the initiative lies 
overwhelmingly with the developer to choose the preferred site. Official 
decision procedures are  thus geared to a single site, under the Town and 
Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972. The Shell-Esso developments were 
handled as a normal planning application. 
As a matter  of fact Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay was not the first site 
chosen for the facilities proposed. An earlier decision process in respect 
of the NGI, plant application for a site at Peterhead had reached the pub- 
lic inquiry stage before being abandoned due to unsuitable harbor condi- 
tions (see Appendix 1). Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay was identified as a 
potentially su.itable site, and hence became the subject of a planning 
application, only after the abandonment of Peterhead. 
The absence of simultaneous consideration of alternative sites within 
statutory decision processes in the 1JK means that site choice is essen- 
tially a boundary condition rather than an open issue to be debated. This 
is not to say that individual parties to the decision had not been involved 
in their own private appraisals of alternative sites, and engaged in infor- 
mal consultations with relevant statutory authorities, in order to estab- 
lish their own preferred choice, and possibly to identify contingency 
alternatives. Nor is i t  to deny the existence of general guidelines and 
zoning restrictions for the siting of large-scale oil related developments 
(Scottish Development Department 1974, and Figure 2.3). The 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay site was the oil companies preferred (only?) 
site and moreover, is among those identified by the Scottish Development 
Department and relevant local authorities, as potentially suitable for 
large-scale industrial development (See for example, Scottish Develop- 
ment Department 1977). 
The position of site choice as a boundary condition rather than an 
open question is an  issue that will be given fuller consideration below. It 
met the interests of some parties but others were dissatisfied that  many 
important dimensions could not be adequately appraised against a single 
site alone, but only in a comparison of several alternatives. 
According to the main supporters of the developments, a number of 
features combined to make the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay site suitable (in 
some opinions eminently so) for the developments proposed. 
(1) At Mossmorran a 700 acre greenfield site, large enough to 
accommodate the NGL plant (125 acres), the ethylene cracker 
(85 acres) and possible downstream industries. This represents 
a large industrial site by any standards in the UK, and one that 
had for sometime been proposed for industrial development by 
the local authorities. 
(2) A sizeable construction labor force locally available thus avoid- 
ing the need for temporary worker accommodation; although 
not all such labor would be recruited immediately locally (i .e. ,  
from Fife) all would be within daily traveling distance. 
(3) A site with good communications to markets for possible down- 
stream products (i.e., rest of UK and Europe); 
(4) Labor readily available for such industries. 
(5) A site at  close proximity (4  miles) to an  eminently suitable 
berthng location at  Braefoot Ray for the export of liquid cargo. 
The advantages of Braefoot Bay included water of adequate natural 
depth for jetty facilities, protected by Inchcolm Island against wind and 
waves and situated away from the main Forth Estuary shipping channel; 
the only large vessels to be allowed in Mortimers Deep would be those for 
the terminal (see map in Figure 2.4). The natural contours of the shore- 
line would visually screen much of these facilities from Aberdour and Dal- 
gety Bay. 
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Against these advantages, objectors pointed to the close proximity of 
Braefoot Bay to residential areas (see Figure 2.4) .  Their primary concern 
was for the safety of their own communities--Aberdour and Dalgety Bay-- 
but they also pointed out the proximity of the marine operations to other 
populations on both sides of the Forth, including Edinburgh. They were 
concerned too about the destruction of ecological habitats, a not insignifi- 
cant tourist location (mostly day trippers to Aberdour), and local heri- 
tage and intrusion of industry on a relatively unspoiled stretch on the 
North shoreline of the Forth. Interference with yachting was seen as a 
further problem. Moreover, the objectors were not convinced that  feasi- 
ble alternative sites did not exist. 
The Mossmorran site presented fewer disadvantages. Although the 
land is currently farmed, none is of outstandingly high agricultural qual- 
ity, and much is low in quality (Department of Agriculture advice). 
Although a housing estate (Gray Park) is situated to the edge of the 
Mossmorran site, it was considered to be practicable to re-house the 
occupants should the need arise (see Appendix 2). 
It is important to recognize the socio-economic characteristics of 
the resident population both near Mossmorran and near Braefoot Bay. 
Cowdenbeath (near Mossmorran) has a high proportion of un- and semi- 
skilled labor with a relatively high unemployment rate. Aberdour and Dal- 
gety Bay (near Braefoot Bay) are predominantly middle class communi- 
ties, suffering little unemployment, and mostly employed in local light 
industries or commuters to professions in Edinburgh. 
It is understood that  a number of other locations expressed interest 
in attracting the developments represented by applications (a),  (b),  and 
(c) ,  including areas in Grampian, Clyde, and North-West Scotland. Possi- 
ble additional sites that were considered by the oil companies are noted 
in Chapter 5. 
2.3. THE MAIN PARTIES TO THE DECISION 
The initiating parties of the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay proposals were 
Shell UK Expro and Esso Chemical L,td (referred to throughout t h s  report 
as Shell and Esso) being the respective applicants for the NGL plant (and 
associated pipeline facilities to and berthing facilities a t  Braefoot Bay) 
and for the ethylene cracker (and associated pipeline facilities to and 
berthing facilities a t  Braefoot Bay); Esso was also the applicant for possi- 
ble downstream petro-chemical developments. 
The Shell group, one of t.he seven oil "majors," is a private interna- 
tional Anglo-Dutch enterprise, with majority shareholding in the Nether- 
lands, but operational and commercial headquarters in London. Shell UK 
Expro (short for exploration and production) is a subsidiary formed to 
manage Shell's exploitation of North Sea reserves. 
Esso Chemical Ltd is a UK company which is responsible for all the 
chemical operations of the Esso Group within the UK. It is part  of the 
multi-national Exxon chemical organization (formerly Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, and another of the seven oil "majors"). Exxon chemical is a 
pioneer in the development of ethylene plants and in 1977 was producing 
ethylene a t  nine 1.ocation.s throughout the world with a total of 200 
cumulative years of operating experience 
A final decision on the proposals by Shell and Esso for Mossmorran- 
Braefoot Bay involved a balance between local and national costs and 
benefits, and the divergent views on various dimensions that were to be 
expressed by various parties involved (see Figure 2.5). The parties will be 
introduced here roughly according to their hierarchy in the decision pro- 
cess. 
The individual with overall responsibility for the decision outcome 
was the Secretary of State for Scotland, a politically appointed national 
government cabinet minister. Very few planning applications are des- 
tined for ministerial consideration (by the Secretary of State for Scotland 
in the case of developments in Scotland; by the Secretary of State for the 
Environment or  for Wales for developments else-where in the UK). 
Development applications involving issues of national importance are 
automatically notified to the minister (in practice this has included all 
major oil-related developments in Scotland), who may use his discretion 
in deciding whether to "call them in," and thereby assume the role .of 
decision taker under the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972. 
It is usual for major new oil-related applications to be called in for min- 
isterial determination (the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkneys and the Nigg 
Bay gas facilities were two exceptions in t h s  respect), and thus the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay "call in!' was in the normal course of events. 
A change in national government in May 1979, three months before 
the final decision of approval saw the replacement of the Labor Minister, 
Bruce Millan, by the Conservative Minister, George Younger, as Secretary 
of State for Scotland. 
Although final judge of the outcome, the Secretary of State does not 
witness the decision proceedings directly. His is a "behind closed doors" 
decision, based on written submissions from parties involved, a summary 
and recommendations of any public inquiry (more on public inquiries in 
Chapter 5), national issues relevant to the case, h s  discretionary 
appraisal of additional representations that  may be lodged with him and 
any further information he deems it suitable to request. He is aided. by 
legal and other internal advisers. 
The Secretary of State for Scotland operates through the Scottish 
Office, and the Scottish Development Department is the department 
within the Scottish Office whch acts for the Secretary of State in the 
capacity of development control authority for planni-ng applications 
which are called in by him. This administrative role includes setting up 
any Public Inquiry, including the appointment of the Reporter, and co- 
ordinating the passage of information between the Secretary of State an.d 
other parties to the decision. 
The Scottish Office is an "omnibus" department with functi.ons for 
Scotland that incorporate those of several individual government depart- 
ments For the rest of the UK. In addition to their administrative role in 
relation to development control, another function of the Scottish Develop- 
ment Department significant to the present decision relates to forward 
planning in Scotland. One of its functions in this respect is to guide and 
to encourage the establishment of North Sea oil and gas related develop- 
ments in Scotland. Although this does not extend to an explicit location 
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policy there has long been a call for one (Department of Industry 1976, 
various press reports). Its site evaluation is one of satisfying rather than 
optimizing, i .e. ,  a site can be considered suitable for a given purpose as 
long as it meets (satisfies) a number of relevant criteria; it does not 
necessarily have to be the best (optimum) in relation to those criteria. 
The roles of development control and development planning can be 
mutually complementary, and considerations of efficiency would suggest 
that  possible conflict between policy (or development planning) and 
administration (development control) should be minimized. This suggests 
a preference towards a decision approval for the Mossmorran-Braefoot 
Bay applications and raises the issue of whether the Scottish Develop- 
ment Department can be expected to (or indeed, should) be completely 
impartial in undertaking its official administrative job as independent 
arbiter of any conflicts arising in the decision process. The strong 
national interest arguments in the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay case are 
also likely to find support from the Scottish Office. 
Of the various civil servants within the Scottish Office involved in the 
decision process, the Inquiry Reporter deserves par'ticular attention. As 
will become evident below, a Public Inquiry was to become the centre- 
piece of the decision process, as the main forum for individual parties to 
present their cases for or against the developments, and to cross exam- 
ine statements made by others. The Public Inquiry is presided over by a 
Reporter, sometimes assisted by a technical assessor, whose role is to 
direct the proceedings, summarize them and present h s  findings and 
recommendations to the Secretary of State. The Reporter in the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay case, was highly respected by the main parties 
involved. 
Various national government departments were consulted about vari- 
ous aspects of the developments--the Department of Agriculture for a 
reaction to farming consequences; the Department of Employment for a 
reaction to job' prospects--and those most directly interested in the deci- 
sion outcome (and hence in monitoring the decision process) were the 
Department of Energy and to a lesser extent the Department of Industry. 
The Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay proposals would contribute to the  stated 
aims of national energy policy in relation to North Sea exploitation by 
allowing a more efficient use of the hydrocarbon resources of the Brent 
oil and gas field. Foreign markets for the end-products from the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay installations would ensure a positive contribu- 
tion to the UK balance of payments. The national prestige of the develop- 
ments is also important (see Chapter 3.2). 
The views of national departments were communicated through the 
normal course of official and unofficial interdepartmental exchanges, and 
apart from initial brief statements (see below) were not open to external 
observation. In particular, representatives of these departments were 
not present at  the Public Inquiry. 
At the local level, two tiers of government may be identified: 
Regional and District (see Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973). The 
Mossrnorran site straddles the boundary between Dunfermline and 
Kirkcaldy Districts, Braefoot Bay lies withn Dunfermline District, and 
both Districts lie within the Fife Region. These three local authorities 
were thus directly involved in the Mossmorran decision. 
The District Council is the usual development control authority (i .e. ,  
administrative unit) for planning applications; it is a t  the District level 
that  all such applications are initially lodged. The District Council must 
publicize all potentially contentious applications, consult all potentially 
interested parties, and notify the higher tiers of authority (Regional 
Council or Scottish Office) of any applications that carry significant impli- 
cations likely to extend beyond the District boundary. For applications 
tha t  are not called-in following such notification, the District Council 
would retain overall administrative (and decision-taking) responsibility. 
For those that are  called-in the District Council would communicate its 
own views alongside those of other parties to the decision. 
The local district and regional councils were all to support the 
Mossmorran-Braef oot Bay developments and co-ordinated their con- 
sideration of them, there being no substantial differences in interest. 
Crucial in their consideration of the safety aspects of the proposals was 
their appointment of the private firm of chemical, engineering, and scien- 
tific consultants, Cremer and Warner, to advise them on safety, and 
environmental nuisance aspects of the planning applications. The main 
report produced by Cremer and Warner (1977) was referred to exten- 
sively throughout the decision process as it was the most detailed hazard 
assessment carried out a t  the time. 
The regional and district councils consist of members elected demo- 
cratically by the local population (relevant local authority elections are 
held every fourth year. Planning applications may be determined by the 
full council (as in the present case) or delegated to their respective plan- 
ning sub-committees (meeting monthly, advised by officers from local 
planning departments). Apart from individual consideration by each 
regional and district authority, joint liaison committees co-ordinate con- 
sideration of planning developments which may affect several districts. 
In addition to the above mentioned tiers of local and national govern- 
ment, two further statutory authorities, the Health and Safety Executive 
and the Forth Ports Authority were directly involved. 
The Health and Safety Executive is the statutory UK guardian of 
safety: a national regulatory body responsible for the implementation of 
the Health and Safety a t  Work (etc.)  Act 1974 and any subsequent regula- 
tions stemming I:rorn this Act. The general provisions of this Act and asso- 
ciated regulations are that operators of potentially hazardous activity 
must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that  neither their 
employees nor the public are exposed to risks to their health or safety as 
a result of their activities. As well as its regulatory role, the Health and 
Safety Executive undertakes advisory work, including advice to local 
authorities (and the Secretary of State in th.e case of "called in" applica- 
tions), on planning matters relating to potentially hazardous installations. 
In particular, since 1972 there has been a voluntary arrangement 
between local a-uthorities and th.e Health and. Safety Executive (or its 
predecessor, the Factory lnspectorate of the Department of Employment) 
for the former to consult the latter about planning applications for major 
hazard installations, and for other applications in the vicinity of su.ch 
installations. The voluntary arrangement will bec0m.e statutory from 
August 1981. The nature of the Executive's advisory role has undergone 
some significant changes in recent years, though a full account of these 
goes beyond the scope of the present report.  
The Health and Safety Executive are  funded by the Department of 
Employment, but are internally responsible for allocating their grant 
between their various activities. They are  keen to s tress  their indepen- 
dence of government policy and of other government departments. 
The Health and Safety Executive are satisfied that the powers avail- 
able t o  them under the Health and Safety a t  Work Act are shfficiently 
strong for the job they are  require'd to do. The ultimate power is that a 
prohibition notice can be served on any operators of installations whose 
activities do not meet  the requirements of the Health and Safety a t  Work 
Act ( the Act includes provision for any necessary information to  be 
obtained by Health and Safety Executive, o r  necessary inspection t o  be 
carried out by them); difficulties are  normally resolved without recourse 
to  this power. 
The Forth Ports Authority are  statutorally responsible for (a) piloting 
and shpping safety in the Forth Estuary (it is a compulsory pilotage 
area--except for naval vessels--and there would be no question of com- 
mercial s h p s  entering Braefoot Bay without a pilot); and (b) leasing the 
jetties on the Forth Estuary (it is Forth Ports Authority policy to own 
large jetties themselves and to lease them to operators in discharging 
their functions). I t  was thus necessary for the Forth Ports Authority to 
approve of Braefoot Bay as  a suitable site for the  marine terminal (they 
appeared to have no hesitation in so doing), and to  be satisfied that they 
had sufficient powers to  ensure that gas tankers could be handled safely 
in the estuary. They appeared to have no reservations on this lat ter  
count, particularly in view of recent legislation, "The Forth Ports Author- 
ity Confirmation Act 1980" which strengthens their previous powers in 
implementing recommendations made by the National Ports Council 
(Hazardous Cargoes in Port Approaches 1976). 
The remaining main parties to the decision were public interest 
groups opposed to the  developments, notably from residents in Aberdour 
and Dalgety Bay, two villages each with an estimated population of 3,000 
whose built up areas extended wi thn a mile of the proposed terminal a t  
Braefoot Bay (see Figure 2.4). A combined Action Group was formed from 
the Aberdour Residents and Dalgety Bay Ratepayers Associations to coor- 
dinate opposition from these villages. Opposition was initial1.y based on 
environmental, amenity and safety grounds, though safety considerations 
soon became dominant, to  the exclusion of other factors. The role of the 
Action Group became to  increase the thoroughness and degree of detail 
with which safety considerations would be (or would be seen to be?) han- 
dled. 'Their cause could be appraised as stemming from genuine concern 
for the safety aspects of the Braefoot Ray terminal, or, more cyn~cally, as 
a desperate at tempt on behalf of a self-interested community to use all 
possible means within the law to  rid their neighborhood of the proposed 
terminal, safety being the grounds on which they would be most likely to 
succeed. Their campaign was mounted almost exclusively on a 
verbal/intellectual, rather  than a physical or theatrical level, though one 
of their number who had previously been involved in opposing a Public 
Inquiry in a different context drew attention to the noise and disturbance 
tha t  it would have been possible to cause on that previous occasion using 
the 25,000 british pounds sterling spent on a n  unsuccessful, peaceful 
campaign. It is notable tha t  the intensity and "professionalism" of "pub- 
lic" opposition to the proposed developments, to  a degree far beyond the 
expectations of other parties involved, s temmed almost exclusively from 
local residents ra ther  than a national environmental group. 
The Action Group considered it neither necessary nor appropriate to  
call on the assistance of the Friends of the Earth 'or other national 
environmental lobby. It was considered unnecessary in view of their own 
"indigenous" expertise which in their view more than matched what was 
likely to be available in other lobbies: Rasbash, the Professor of Fire and 
Safety Enginering a t  Edinburgh University offered his services and 
became their main expert witness,at the Public Inquiry; other individual 
residents in Aberdour and Dalgety Bay had legal and techmcal skills. It 
was considered inappropriate because the issues they were fighting were 
strictly local ( thus 'routing a mob' from other campaigns would not be 
thought to benefit their cause), and in any case other  national lobbies 
were heavily committed to  the Windscale Inquiry, w h c h  was to  take place 
a t  the same time as tha t  for Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay. 
It is difficult to  assess accurately the extent  of support for the Action 
Group lobby among the population of Aberdour and Dalgety Bay, it would 
appear,  from discussions with other main parties, and from informal stu- 
dent interviews there,  to have been widespread (and by no means con- 
fined t o  the main activists in the  Group); a formal survey has not, how- 
ever, been undertaken. 
Not all objections from the public were voiced through the Action 
Group. The Conservation Society (concerned on  safety, ecological and 
historical grounds), various yachting clubs (concerned about the interfer- 
ence of the marine terminal with their pleasure craft), Gray Park Tenants 
Association (local authority tenants on a small estate to the edge of the 
Mossmorran site--see Appendix 2 for their dilemma), and many other indi- 
viduals were to  make their own representations and protests (see section 
4.9). 
Other parties took less prominent roles: the silent majority in 
Cowdenbeath, a town with a population of about 10,000 and a high unem- 
ployment ra te ,  roughly a mile away from Mossmorran, firmly in favor of 
the developments: M.P.'s of all parties with their own individual interests 
and views, though with the exception of the M.P. for Dunfermlin-e, who 
gave evidence to the Inquiry, with no formal part  in the dec is~on process: 
academics of various complexions; the press and. the media (extensive 
coverage in the  Scotsman; also featured in other newspapers, television 
programs--the last mentioned broadly unfavorable t o  the official posi- 
tion). 
2.4. THE MAlN EVENTS IN THE DECISION PROCESS 
As already suggested, the evolution of the decision process is con- 
strained in general terms by the procedures laid down in the Town and 
Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, and indicated in the flow diagram 
in Figure 2.6. Routine statutory procedures are  explained more fully in 
Chapter 5.2. A Public Inquiry into the applications had been anticipated 
by all main parties, affording a principal opportunity to present their own 
cases and to cross examine the cases of other's. This became the centre- 
piece of the decision process and divided it into three distinct stages: 
pre-, intra-, and post-inquiry. There was no overall time constraint on the 
duration of the decision process as a whole, though certain procedures 
within it were bound by statutory time constraints (see below). 
Parties were actively involved to varying extents throughout the 
decision process. A diary of principle events is given in Table 2.2. The 
lodging of formal planning applications (January, February 1977) subdi- 
vides the pre-Inquiry period; before then consideration of the proposed 
developments by the main parties had been essentially informal; 
thereafter,  consideration became more formal, in line with statutory pro- 
cedures, and the main formal analyses were prepared. The period follow- 
ing the Public Inquiry, July 1977 until August 1979, again subdivides into 
two. Until December 1977 a normal course of events was being followed-- 
the Inquiry report had been received for consideration by the Secretary 
of State and his final decision was awaited. However, in January 1978 a 
new issue was raised, namely a potential ignition hazard posed by break 
sparks from radio transmissions. Consideration of this issue delayed the 
final decision until August 1979, over eighteen months later than the time 
a t  whlch it  had been expected. A detailed decision diary is given in Table 
2.3. Although for the purposes of the present report the decision process 
is considered to end with the decision of approval in August 1979, a 
number of key events which occurred since then are recorded in Table 
2.4. 
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Figure 2.6. Flow diagram of decision events. 
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Table 2.2.  Decision Diary: Principal Events 
I July 1976 
November 1976 
January 1977 
February 1977 
March 1977 
April 1977 
June-July 1977 
November 1977 
March 1978 
August 1979 
Shell/Esso contact Fife local authorities to discuss 
the potential of Mossmorran to accommodate n.g.1. 
plant and ethylene cracker. 
Shell declare intention to submit planning applica- 
tions for sites a t  Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay 
Esso declare intention to submit planning applica- 
tions for sites a t  Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay 
Shell submit planning applications for n.g.1. plant 
and associated facilities 
Esso submit planning applications for ethylene 
cracker and associated facilities 
The Secretary of State "calls in" the n.g.1. plant ap- 
plication 
Esso submit a planning application for the down- 
stream development of the rest of the Mossmorran 
site 
The Secretary of State "calls in" the ethylene crack- 
e r  application 
The Secretary of State "calls in" the downstream 
development application. 
A Public Inquiry into all applications is held 
The Inquiry Reporter submits h s  report to the 
Secretary of State 
The Secretary of State indicates his provisional ap- 
proval of the planning applications, but asks for 
further evidence on the radio-spark ignition hazard 
The Secretary of State gives h s  approval to the 
developments, i .e . ,  grants outline planning permis- 
sion, subject to a large number of conditions. 
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Table  2 . 3 .  ( c o n t i n u e d )  
DATE 
The F i f e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  b r i e f  Cremer and  Warner ( p r i v a t e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
c o n s u l t a n t s )  t o  r e p o r t  on' t h e  h a z a r d  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  impac t  o f  t h e  
S h e l l / E s s o  p r o p o s a l s .  
EVENTS 
J a n u a r y  1977 
( 2 0 t h )  S h e l l  f o r m a l l y  s u b m i t  n.g.1.  p l a n t  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  Dunferml ine  and  
K i r k c a l d y  D i s t r i c t  Counc i l .  
E s s o  d e c l a r e  i n t e n t i o n  to  s u b m i t  p l a n n i n g  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  e t h y l e n e  c r a c k e r  a t  
Mossmorran a n d  a s s o c i a t e d  p i p e l i n e  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  and b e r t h i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  
a t  B r a e f o o t  Bay. 
l ~ e b r u a r ~  1977 1 ( 7 t h )  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  ' c a l l s  i n '  t h e  p l a n n i n g  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  n.g.1.  
I p l a n t .  
( 2 4 t h )  E s s o  f o r m a l l y  s u b m i t  e t h y l e n e  c r a c k e r  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  Dunfermline  
and K i r k c a l d y  D i s t r i c t  Counc i l .  
Aberdour  R a t e p a y e r s  a n d  D a l g e t y  Bay R e s i d e n t s  A s s o c i a t i o n s  combine t o  form a 
J o i n t  A c t i o n  Group t o  f i g h t  t h e  p r o p o s a l s .  They r e - d i r e c t  e a r l i e r  f e a r s  t o  
t h e  S c o t t i s h  Development Depar tment  a n d  a s k ,  f o r m a l l y ,  f o r  a P l a n n i n g  I n q u i r y  
Commission ( s i n c e  t h e  c a l l  i n ,  t h e  deve lopmen t  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h e  
p r o p o s a l s )  . 
( 2 1 s t )  E s s o  s u b m i t  p l a n n i n g  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  downst ream i n d u s t r i a l  deve lopmen t  
on  t h e  b s s m o r r a n  s i te .  
l ~ a r c h  1977 I ( 1 s t )  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  ' c a l l s  i n '  t h e  e t h y l e n e  c r a c k e r  a p p l i c a t i o n .  I 
P u b l i c  e x h i b i t i o n s  a r e  h e l d  by S h e l l ,  E s s o  and  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  D a l g e t y  Bay 
and  A u c h t e r t o o l  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l .  
A p r i l  1977 
( 1 8 t h )  Meet ing o f  K i r k c a l d y  D i s t r i c t  C o u n c i l  a g r e e s  t h a t  t h e  ' b a l a n c e  o f  
a d v a n t a g e '  lies i n  a p p r o v i n g  the g a s  p l a n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
( 5 t h )  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  ' c a l l s  i n '  the p l a n n i n g  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  downst ream 
i n d u s t r i a l  development .  
J o i n t  A c t i o n  Group a s k  S c o t t i s h  Development Depar tment  to  d i s c u s s  w i t h  them 
p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  s i t e s  f o r  t h e  p r o p o s a l s .  L i t t l e  r e a c t i o n .  O b j e c t o r s  
c o n s i d e r  odds  t o  b e  s t a c k e d  a g a i n s t  them. 
COMMENTS 
The Cremer and Warner r e p o r t  
was t o  b e  t h e  m o s t  s u b s t a n t i a l  
o n e  p roduced  on h a z a r d  d u r i n g  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s .  
The S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  t h u s  
becomes "THE" d e c i s i o n  t a k e r .  
Reques t  r e f u s e d .  
F i r s t  o f f i c i a l  r e a c t i o n  from 
K i r k c a l d y  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  c a n n o t  t a l k  
t o  i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t i e s  o n c e  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  f o r m a l l y  
b e f o r e  him. 
Table 2.3.  ( c o n t i n u e d )  
DATE 
May 1977 
J u n e  1977 
~ u l y  1977 
November 1977 
J a n u a r y  1978 
EVENTS 
( 6 t h )  The  S c o t t i s h  Development Depar tment  announce t h a t  a  P u b l i c  I n q u i r y  i n t o  a l l  
t h r e e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  is t o  open i n  Dunfermline ,  1 3 t h  J u n e  1977. 
Cremer and  Warner Hazard and  Env i ronmen ta l  Impac t  Repor t  is r e c e i v e d  by t h e  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  
The l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i s s u e  t h e i r  j o i n t  r e p o r t  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  and  
a s s e s s i n g  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  economic, l and-use ,  env i ronmen ta l  and h a z a r d  impac t .  
( 3 1 s t )  Ac t ion  Group mount e x h i b i t i o n  i n  Edinburgh to p u b l i c i z e  d a n g e r  o f  p l a n t .  
( 3 1 s t )  A meet ing  o f  Dunfermline  D i s t r i c t  Counc i l  o f f i c i a l l y  approves  t h e  p l a n n i n g  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  i n  p r i n c i p l e  ( s u b j e c t  t o  a  number o f  p l a n n i n g  c o n d i t i o n s ) .  
( 3 1 s t )  A meet ing  o f  F i f e  Reg iona l  Counc i l  o f f i c i a l l y  a p p r o v e s  t h e  p l a n n i n g  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  i n  p r i n c i p l e  ( s u b j e c t  t o  a  number o f  p l a n n i n g  c o n d i t i o n s ) .  
( 4 t h )  The I n q u i r y  R e p o r t e r  ( M r .  B e l l )  h b l d s  a  p r e - I n q u i r y  mee t ing  i n  Dunfermline  
to d e c i d e  a  s u i t a b l e  o r d e r  f o r  and  t i m i n g  o f  t h e  c a s e s  by t h e  v a r i o u s  p a r t i e s .  
A l so  to a s k  f o r  advance  w r i t t e n  s t a t e m e n t s  from t h e  main p a r t i e s .  Loca l  
a u t h o r i t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  v i s i t  S tenungsund.  
( 1 0 t h )  J o i n t  Ac t ion  Group a s k  f o r  a  f u r t h e r  postponement  o f  t h e  I n q u i r y .  Not 
COMMENTS 
L a t e r  pos tponed  u n t i l  27th  J u n e  
a t  o b j e c t o r s  r e q u e s t .  
Unanimous 
Unanimous 
g r a n t e d .  
( 2 7 t h )  P u b l i c  I n q u i r y  opens .  
( 2 1 s t )  P u b l i c  I n q u i r y  c l o s e s .  
I n q u i r y  R e p o r t e r  s u b m i t s  h i s  summary o f  the I n q u i r y  P r o c e e d i n g s  and h i s  P a r t i e s  have had  t h e  oppor- 
c o n d i t i o n a l  r e c o m e n d a t i o n  o f  a p p r o v a l  t o  the S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e .  t u n i t y  o f  commenting on t h e  
f a c t u a l  a c c u r a c y  o f  summary. 
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e ,  i n  answer t o  a  q u e s t i o n  r a i s e d  i n  P a r l i a m e n t ,  s a i d  t h a t  
h e  e x p e c t e d  t o  announce h i s  d e c i s i o n  b e f o r e  t h e  end  o f  t h e  y e a r .  
( 2 4 t h )  J o i n t  Ac t ion  Group r a i s e  t h e  i s s u e  o f  r a d i o - s p a r k  i g n i t i o n  h a z a r d  A n  i s s u e  c o m p l e t e l y  o v e r l o o k e d  
( i n  a  l e t t e r  t o  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e )  a t  t h e  P u b l i c  I n q u i r y  
-- 
T a b l e  2 . 3 .  ( c o n t i n u e d )  
COMENTS 
The P u b l i c  I n q u i r y  Report was 
i s s u e d  wi th  t h i s  d e c i s i o n .  
Only r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  
t o  rad io-sparks  could be  
submi t ted  from t h i s  time. 
b. 
DATE 
March 1978 
Apr i l  1978 
I 
June 1978 
J u l y  1978 
August 1978 
September 1978 
October  1978 
EVENTS 
( 6 t h )  Hea l th  and S a f e t y  Execut ive  r e p l y  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  radio-spark i g n i t i o n  
hazard ,  s t a t i n g  t h e  view t h a t  " t h e r e  is c e r t a i n l y  no need f o r  p lann ing  
permiss ion  t o  be  h e l d  up on t h i s  count." 
( 2 9 t h )  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  announces h i s  p r o v i s i o n a l  view t h a t  p lann ing  permission 
should  be  g r a n t e d ,  s u b j e c t  t o  a range o f  c o n d i t i o n s ,  b u t  asked f o r  f u r t h e r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  from p a r t i e s  on t h e  i s s u e  o f  p o s s i b l e  hazards  from r a d i o  
t ransmiss ions .  These r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  were t o  be  made w i t h i n  28 days. 
( 2 1 s t )  Cremer and Warner r e p o r t  t o  t h e  F i f e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  
of  r a d i o  t r a n s m i s s i o n s  hazard.  
Represen ta t ions  r e c e i v e d  by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  on t h e  i s s u e  o f  p o s s i b l e  
hazards  from r a d i o  t r a n s m i s s i o n s  s e n t  t o  t h e  Heal th and S a f e t y  Execut ive 
a s  they  a r r i v e d .  
(2nd) The Court  o f  Sess ion  i n ' ~ d i n b u r g h  r u l e s  t h a t  a r e p o r t  on radio-spark 
i g n i t i o n  hazards  (The Excel1 Report)  h e l d  by t h e  S c o t t i s h  Development 
Department should b e  r e l e a s e d  t o  t h e  Action Group. 
Heal th and S a f e t y  Execut ive ' s  r e p o r t  on r a d i o  hazards  s e n t  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  
of  S t a t e  . 
(2nd) The Hea l th  and S a f e t y  Execut ive r e p o r t ,  t o g e t h e r  wi th  o t h e r  r e p r e s e n t a -  
t i o n s  rece ived  on r a d i o  t r a n s m i s s i o n s ,  a r e  c i r c u l a t e d  by t h e  S c o t t i s h  
Development Department t o  a l l  p a r t i e s ,  who were given an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
make f u r t h e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  by 4 t h  September. 
( 8 t h )  Comments were r e c e i v e d  from o b j e c t o r s  c r i t i c i z i n g  t h e  Heal th and S a f e t y  
Execut ive Report.  Objec tors  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  Court  o f  S e s s i o n  f o r  an ex tens ion  
o f  t h e  t ime l i m i t  s e t  i n  August f o r  f u r t h e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  fo l lowing  r e f u s a l  
by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  t o  al low a d d i t i o n a l  time. 
( 2 5 t h )  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  extended t h e  t ime l i m i t  f o r  f u r t h e r  comment u n t i l  
24th October ,  and t h e  Action Group agreed  t o  withdraw t h e  Court  a p p l i c a t i o n  upon 
payment by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  of  t h e  Group's l e g a l  c o s t s .  
The f u r t h e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  rece ived  on rad io- t ransmiss ions  made i t  necessary  
t o  o b t a i n  f u r t h e r  in format ion  from t h e  Hea l th  and s a f e t y  Execut ive.  
Table 2.3. (continued) 
There was much behind the s c e n e s  a c t i v i t y  between s t a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s  on t h e s e  and o t h e r  m a t t e r s ;  b u t  i t  has  n o t  been p o s s i b l e  t o  
i n c l u d e  t h i s .  
DATE 
January 1979 
March 1979 
A p r i l  1979 
May 1979 
June 1979 
August 1979 
EVENTS 
A F i f e  C o u n c i l l o r  e s t i m a t e s  t h e  d e l a y  i n  d e c i s i o n  t o  b e  c o s t i n g  t h e  n a t i o n  5200 
m i l l i o n  a  year ,  
'Shipping h a z a r d s ' ,  a  q u a n t i t a t i v e  assessment  o f  t h e  marine hazards  a t  t h e  Braefoo t  
Bay t e r m i n a l ,  is publ i shed  by t h e  Act ion Group. 
( 1 2 t h )  N e w  m a t e r i a l  from the Heal th  and S a f e t y  Execu t ive  is c i r c u l a t e d  t o  p a r t i e s ,  
who a r e  given u n t i l  18th A p r i l  t o  make f u r t h e r  comnent on t h e  rad io- t ransmiss ion  
q u e s t i o n .  
F u r t h e r  m a t e r i a l  from t h e  Heal th  and S a f e t y  Execu t ive  r e s u l t i n g  from q u e s t i o n s  
r a i s e d b y  t h e  o b j e c t o r s  is c i r c u l a t e d  t o  p a r t i e s .  
( 3 r d )  General  e l e c t i o n  and change o f  n a t i o n a l  government; t h e  Labour m i n i s t e r  
Bruce Mil lan is succeeded by the c o n s e r v a t i v e  m i n i s t e r ,  George Younger, a s  ~ 
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  Sco t land .  
S h o r t  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e b a t e  on Mossmorran. 
( 8 t h )  F u r t h e r ' m a t e r i a l  from the Heal th  and S a f e t y  Execut ive r e s u l t i n g  from 
q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d  by t h e  o b j e c t o r s  is  c i r c u l a t e d  t o  p a r t i e s .  
(19 th)  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from t h e  Act ion Group go t o  London t o  p r e s e n t  t h e i r  
c a s e  d i r e c t l y  t o  M.P.'s a t  Westminster .  Few a t t e n d .  
( 9 t h )  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  announces h i s  d e c i s i o n  o f  approva l .  
COMMENTS 
Bot v e r i f i e d  e i t h e r  by o i l  
companies o r  by Government 
Discussion c u r t a i l e d  because 
it is  improper t o  deba te  t h e  
m e r i t s  o f  t h e  c a s e  b e f o r e  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  is t aken  
Table 2.4. Post-decision diary 
October 1979 Action group lodge an appeal with the Court of Ses- 
sion against the validity of the decision of the Secre- 
tary of State, on the ground that  it was not within 
the powers of Section 32(1) of the Town and Country 
Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 
December 1979 Parliamentary debate on safety aspects of 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay initiated; abandoned for 
exceeding time limits. 
February 1980 (14th) Court of Session reject Action Group's appeal 
against the Secretary of State 
March 1980 Esso lodge planning application to build ethylene 
cracker a t  an alternative location within the 
Mossmorran site. 
Construction work on the ngl plant commences 
October 1980 Esso announce firm intention to proceed with the 
construction of the ethylene cracker 
Public Inquiry into St.  Fergus-Mossmorran pipeline 

CHAPTER 3: 
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE DECISION 
3.1. STATEMhXT OF DIMENSIONS 
The material considerations of the decision may be grouped under 
four broad headings: 
( 1) National benefits 
(2) Local socio-economic benefits 
(3)  Health and Safety aspects 
(4) Envi.ronmenta1 factors. 
All but the first are site specific. The different party perspectives on 
each of these four dimensions will be presented in the next chapter. 
Meanwhle the four dimensions will be explained in more detail. 
3.2 NATIONAL BENEFITS 
The following submission was made in 1977 on behalf of the Depart- 
ment of Energy and issued via the Scottish Development Department in 
June of that year in order to identify the relationship of the proposed 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay developments with the "national interest." 
Apart from a supporting note from the Department of Industry, this was 
the only written statement on the national interest,  and is brief enough to 
be repeated here in full. 
1. It is the Government's policy to seek to obtain maximum value from 
North Sea hydrocarbon resources and i t  recognizes the potential 
economic contribution of an expanding petrochemical industry 
based on a secure feedstock source. 
2. An essential feature of the development program for the Brent field 
will be the construction of an NGL separation plant and associated 
shipping terminal. The Brent production system will eventually 
comprise an oil pipeline to Sullom Voe and a gas pipeline to St.  
Fergus. At the latter site specification gas (mainly methane) will be 
taken out to supply the companies' contract with the British Gas Cor- 
poration. Facilities will also be required to handle and market the 
other heavier gases (the NGLs), whch means that  there has to be a 
plant to separate them from each other and a terminal to ship out 
the propane and butane, much of which is likely to be sold in over- 
seas premium markets. The developments covered by the Shell 
application therefore from part of a highly complex and integrated 
operation and will be required by 1980 in order to fit in with the 
overall development program for the Brent field. 
3. Disposal of the ethane is a key feature of such a program. The inten- 
tion is that  the Esso cracker at Mossmorran will take the ethane 
from the NGL separation plant for the manufacturer of ethylene. A 
development of t h s  kind would be advantageous in terms of Govern- 
ment policy and industrial strategy, as would the fu.rther develop- 
ment of related downstream processes a t  Mossmorran which is 
envisaged in the second Esso planning application. Ethylene is one of 
the principal basic petrochemicals and is used in numerous 
processes to produce a wide range of consumer products. 
4. If alternative outlets had to be sought for the ethane, export would 
not commend itself because the costs involved would be heavy and 
almost certainly uneconomic. Flaring would clearly be wasteful. If 
considered for fuel use (for whch its value would be less than if used 
as  a feedstock) some surplus ethane might be taken by the British 
Gas Corporation, but it is likely that some would have to be used as a 
power station fuel. This could be acceptable for a year or two to 
bridge any gap between the commissioning dates of the NGL separa- 
tion plant and a cracker. Prolonged delay at the planning or con- 
struction stage, and even more a situation where the  cracker was not 
built, would however have adverse consequences for the Scottish coal 
industry and for national energy policy. 
5 .  The present proposal for a cracker should also be seen. in the context 
of the report of the Organic Sector Working Party of NED0 in relation 
to the Industrial Strategy. That report saw a major opportunity for 
an  expansion of the  UK petro-chemical industry, requiring by 1985 
the construction of 4 new ethylene crackers in addition to the one 
under construction for ICI on Teeside. The Secretary of State for 
Industry, endorsing the Sector Working Party's recommendations 
explained that 4 crackers would not only be needed to meet the 
expected growth in UK consumption but would also make a major 
contribution to the balance of payments through exports. He 
emphasized that it would be in the national interest that the right 
projects took place a t  the right sites, on time and on a commercially 
viable basis. 
6. Relevant Government guidance of a general nature has been given to 
planning authorities in the Scottish Development Department's 
"North Sea Oil and Gas Coastal Planning Guidelines" published in 
August 1974. Preferred development and conservation zones were 
identified: parts of the Forth Estuary were included within a pre- 
ferred development zone. Most recently the issue of National Plan- 
ning Guidelines in May 1977 has given further planning guidance. 
Copies of the Guidelines are enclosed. It should be noted that the 
Guidelines are  expressly declared not to be intended to override the 
provisions of existing development plans nor to prejudice the deci- 
sion of the local authority or the Secretary of State on individual 
planning applications. 
It is clear from the above statement that it was officially said to be in the 
national interest for developments such as those proposed for 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay to go ahead, though none of the national bene- 
fits are directly site-specific. 
various attempts a t  quantifyin.g these national benefits appeared 
from time to time during the decision process. The most popular of these 
referred to net export earnings from propane, butane, and ethylene 
(assuming all would go to export markets) of 260 million pounds stg. a 
year a t  1977 prices. The later export of ethylene derivatives from down- 
stream industries wou1.d fetch consi.derably higher earnings still. Since 
Shell and Esso are private companies, national benefits from this source 
would arise indirectly in terms of balance of payments contributions. 
Attempts to put a value on such earnings are fraught with di.fficulties, not 
least through significant fluctuations in the world market price of the 
gases in recent years. I t  is even more treacherous to at tempt to put a 
value on the cost to the nation of a longer than usual decision process 
(m.ore on this below). Further monetary benefits to the nation (as dis- 
tinct from local socio-economic benefits) would arise from tax and royalty 
revenues ( i .e . ,  income to the national exchequer) that; are levied on all 
North Sea production. However, these are considered to be small in rela- 
tion to corresponding revenues from Brent oil (compare 3 x lo6  tons per 
annurn. natural gas liquids with 20 x lo6  tons per annurn oil). 
Agai.nst such possible national benefits should be set  the national 
monetary costs to be incurred. In t h s  case t h s  would include govern- 
ment grants amounting to 20% of th.e construction costs of the natural 
gas liquids plant (estimated total cost in 1979 of 200 million pounds stg.) 
and of the ethylene cracker (estimated total cost in 1979 of 250 million 
pounds stg.) ,  other (possibly quite considerable) capital allowances, and 
the "adverse consequences for the coal industry and for national energy 
policy" (see paragraph 4 above) if the cracker was not built. 
Apart from overall monetary cost-benefit calculations such as those 
indicated above, a further national benefit from th.e project and arguably 
the most significant, was that of prestige. Although no written statement 
appeared, this aspect probably became increasingly important as the 
decision process became increasingly prolonged. A government which 
had stated its commitment to encourage petro-chemical industries in the 
UK was to be seen supervising a decision period of two and a half years, 
between their initial "call-in" of the applications and their final decision of 
approval. Nine months would have been a more appropriate decision 
period. The psychological cost to the nation (in terms of discouraging 
other, particularly oil related, investment by multi-national companies in 
the UK) of a decision that went against the oil companies after such a big 
decision process could have been disastrous. 
There would be no forum in which the national merits of the project 
could be openly discussed; in particular they were excluded from con- 
sideration at the Public Inquiry (debate of merits of government policy is 
u s u a l l y  excluded from Public Inquiries). There was no subsequent updat- 
ing of the above official statement in the light of changing national and 
world circumstances over the period of the delay. 
3.3. LOCAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
These would undoubtedly be the main benefits of the project a t  the 
local level; a large scale development (700 acre site is large by any UK 
standards); a prestigious industry, modern technology and offering diver- 
sification to the existing industrial base of the region. The UK chemicals 
industry was recognized as the healthiest sector of British industry, hav- 
ing over the last decade grown about twice as fast as UK manufacturing 
industry as a whole. The construction phase of the plant had been 
estimated to generate directly (on site) up to 3,350 jobs, with a consider- 
able number of additional jobs arising via subcontractors and indirect 
supplies. The operational phase of the NGL plant would employ about 100 
people and the ethylene cracker about 250. Additiorial spending power 
generated locally by wages paid to employees would also create more 
employment in service industries during both construction. and operating 
phases. 
The preliminary appraisal of the local employment impact from the 
construction phase in the joint council's report (Fife 1977) was a favor- 
able one. Although it was difficult a t  the time to estimate with accuracy 
the increase in local income whch could be generated by successful local 
bids for sub-contracts, and the ability to supply relevant skills from the 
local area for the construction phase of the NGL and ethylene cracker, a 
significant expansionary effect on the local economy was foreseen. Taking 
account of the present low level of activity in the construction. industry 
much of the required labor would probably be available in the Fife Region. 
Moreover, "It has been suggested that perhaps in the region of 50% of the 
wage bill during the construction phases and about 60% subsequently 
could be subject to a multiplier effect of somewhere between 1 .2  and 1.5" 
(Fife 1977). The local authorities asked the oil companies early in 1977 to 
undertake as a matter of urgency a study of construction skill require- 
ments, and to use as much local labor as possible. 
In the operational phase of the NGL plant and ethylene cracker there 
would be, as noted above, significantly fewer jobs (of the order of 350 in 
all) and many would of necessity be filled by existing Shell/Esso employ- 
ees. Again, however, the companies undertook to employ (and train in 
some cases) some local people. 
The fear expressed by some local firms supplying similar types of 
labor that they may suffer from increased competition for craftsmen, and 
indeed loose key personnel, could be counterbalanced by advice from the 
Department of Employment indicating that recent experience in areas in 
the UK affected by large-scale oil-related developments such as Aberdeen 
and Methil has shown little, if any, evidence of the collapse of local firms. 
Moreover, i t  was said that  if the effect of oil company competition for 
indigenous skills is to increase the general wage level in the region, then 
the overall increase in regional wealth thereby acheved could be counted 
as a further benefit. 
The Mossmorran site lies adjacent to Cowdenbeath, an area which has 
suffered severe employment problems since the decline in the coal indus- 
try; about 60% of the working population were employed in that industry 
in 1961, falling to 13% in 1968. Unemployment rates for Cowdenbeath in 
April 1977 were estimated a t  19.3%, compared with 7.8% for Scotland as a 
whole. Mossmorran was seen to be an  important site in terms of achiev- 
ing a solution to these unemployment problems. It had been identified as 
one of only three sites within the Fife region which could accommodate 
industrial development on a significant scale, particularly large, single 
industries. 
Possible downstream plastics industries (application (c)) using 
ethylene as a feedstock and generating upwards of 1,600 permanent jobs 
once established might considerably boost the socio-economic benefits. 
The ethylene cracker would be the springboard for those industri.es, and 
Esso had bought additional land on the Mossmorran. site in order to 
accommodate them. Any enthusiasm about t h s  considerable bonus, the 
downstream lollipop, had to be tempered by the uncertainty surrounding 
it: views varied over the likelihood that these industries would become 
established, given the state of the world ethylene /plastics industries and 
markets (current  over capacity but a possible upturn in the future). 
Other potential socio-economic benefits would be less significant 
than the aforementioned. Any increase in local authority rate revenue to 
result would be matched by an equivalent reduction in the rate support 
grant received from the national exchequer. However, although no net  
increase in local rate would result directly from the proposed develop- 
ments, there would be some advantage to the local authorities stemming 
from the fact that there is an element of direct government control over 
spending of funds from the rate support grant,  but no such control over 
local authority spending of directly levied rates. 
A final potential socio-economic advantage of the proposed develop- 
ments might be a psych.ologi.ca1 one, paralleling the prestige argument a t  
the national level. The development of modern industry on such a large 
scale is bound to "put the place on the map;" an advertisement of Fife for 
the outside industrial world. These benefits might dwarf any loss in t o u -  
ism income through loss in amenity at Aberdour and Dalgety Bay, 
although such intangible considerations a t  the local level were in tu rn  
completely dwarfed by the  more tangible benefits of the plant already 
reviewed. 
3.4. HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS 
Any activity involving the bulk handling of liquefied energy gases is 
potentially hazardous. The NGL plant at  Mossmorran is to  have a max- 
imum intake capacity of 2.1 x 10"ons per annum, and the ethylene 
cracker  a maximum production capacity of 0.6 x l o 6  tons p e r  annum. In 
addition t o  process plant, storage facilities for propane, butane,  natural 
gasoline and ethane a r e  required at Mossmorran, and for ethylene a t  
Braefoot Bay. The downstream industrial developments would provide a 
further potential source of hazard; however, since little detail about the 
nature of these industries was specified in the planning application little 
appraisal of the hazard potential could be offered. 
The following paragraphs concerning hazard potential a r e  taken from 
the  findings of fact  from the Public Inquiry: 
"The presence of these installations means tha t  t he re  is a risk of 
leaks of the product.  As the main products, butane, propane, 
and ethylene a re  stored and shipped a t  very low temperatures ,  
any escape will vaporize in air and form a vapor cloud w h c h  will 
dilute steadily as  it drifts downwind. The cloud will pick up heat  
from the air  and  from the surface over which it travels. The 
degree of hea t  gained will increase the buoyancy of the cloud 
and affect its r a t e  of dispersion," 
"Initially the cloud will be so rich tha t  it will be capable of burn- 
ing only a t  its edges. On further dilution, it will be sufficiently 
mixed with air t o  be able to burn throughout i ts volume. At this 
stage it is a t  its most explosive potential. The cloud mix may 
not be homogeneous, however, it can  contain r ich and lean 
pockets." 
"Unless the cloud meets  a source of ignition, it will continue t o  
flow downwind unt.il its concentration is below its lower flamma- 
bility limit, when it can no longer ignite." 
"If the cloud meets  an  ignition source before reaching the lower 
flammability limit, it will burn but the nature of the  combustion 
is uncertai.n. It could be qui.et burning or explosive burning with 
high over-pressur-es. Open flammable cloud explosions have 
occurred in vapor clouds resulting from the spill of tons of 
butane, propane and ethylene." 
"Factors which determine when explosion, rather  than  fire, will 
result include: the energy of the ignition source, the degree of 
result include: the energy of the ignition source, the degree of 
mixing of gas and air within the cloud, the degree of confine- 
ment of the cloud and the chemical reactivity of the gas but the 
degree and effect of their interrelation in a given situation is 
very uncertain." 
Due to the geography of the vicinity, and in particular the communi- 
ties of Aberdour, Dalgety Bay and Cowdenbeath (Figure 3.1), a residual 
risk, however small, affects members of the public as well as industry 
personnel. T h s  aspect was the crucial catalyst for the vehement and pro- 
longed opposition to the proposals. It will be seen below that  parties had 
different views on the thoroughness with w h c h  safety ought to be investi- 
gated a t  various stages in the decision process, on the criteria to be used 
to appraise safety, and differing levels of confidence in the official guardi- 
ans of safety. 
Realization of fire or  explosion hazard will result from loss of contain- 
ment of gas and the presence of a source of ignition--an open flame or a 
stray spark. Prudent safety measures, maximum credible spills, travel 
distances in relation to lower flammability limits of an unintentional 
release of gas, and likely ignition sources were discussed a t  some length 
a t  the Public Inquiry. However, some time after the Inquiry, the presence 
of a further, hitherto overlooked, ignition source was identified, namely 
stray electro-magnetic break sparks from radio transmissions both from 
a stationary commercial transmitter,  and from marine (naval and com- 
mercial) traffic. As mentioned elsewhere in this report,  consideration of 
this ignition source in relation to the hazard implications of the Braefoot 
Bay terminal was to prolong the decision process considerably. 
3.5. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
The environmental impacts other than potential hazard, included 
noise, visual and marine pollution, agricultural and heritage losses; also, 
interference with amenity yachting in Mortimer's Deep, occasional tour- 
ism in Aberdour, and visits to Inchcolm Abbey (see Figure 3.2). These 
impacts relate almost exclusively to the Braefoot Bay terminal rather  
than the Mossmorran site. 
Figure 3.1.  Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay i n  Relation t o  
Populated Areas 


CHAPTER 4: 
PARTY PERSPECTIVES ON VARIOUS DIMENSIONS 
4.1. OVERWEN OF CONFLICTS 
The purpose of t h s  chapter is to review party perspectives on the 
main dimensions of the decision, with reference to their available infor- 
mation and chosen evaluation criteria. A summary of party positions is 
given in Table 4.1. Party conflicts over individual dimensions may be 
identified by considering each column in turn.  There was little change in 
party viewpoints as the decision process evolved. 
4.2. THE OIL COMPANIES: SHELL AND ESSO 
4.2.1. National Benefits 
This was a development for whch  the objectives of the companies 
apparently coincided with the national interest. Efficient utilization of 
Brent resources required facilities such as those now proposed for 
Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay. 
4.2.2. Local Socio-Economic Benefits 
Although construction contracts would have to be awarded on the 
basis of competitive bidding, a significant proportion of construction work 
force would probably be recruited locally: a condition of tendering for 
the major contracts would be that manpower needs in relation to local 
skills should be discussed with Fife Regional Authority. The local 
Table 4 .1 .  Party Perspectives on the  Dimensions 
HEALTH AND SAPETY 
I t  is not  i n  companies 
i n t e r e s t s  t o  b u i l d  unsafe 
p l an t .  Sa f e ty  record  t o  
d a t e  is good. High 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  s t anda rds ,  
codes of p r a c t i c e  and 
personnel  o f  t he  h ighes t  
c a l i b r e  w i l l  ensure  s a f e ty .  
Accepted advice from Cremer 
and Warner t h a t  p l a n t  can 
be designed, b u i l t  and 
opera ted  so  a s  t o  be 
acceptable  i n  t e r n s  of 
community s a f e t y .  
--. 
To be assessed  i n  t h e  l i g h t  
of a l l  evidence, par t icu-  
l a r l y  t h a t  o f  t h e  Heal thand 
Safe ty  Executive,  given the  
imposition o f  appropr ia te  
p lanning condi t ions .  
Operators mwt ensure ,  a s  
f a r  a s  is reasonably prac- 
t i c a b l e ,  t h a t  nobody 
(employee o r  pub l i c )  is 
exposed t o  r i s k s  t o  t h e i r  
hea l t h  o r  s a f e ty .  The 
proposed mssmorran- 
Braefoot  Bay i n s t a l l a t i o n s  
can meet t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  i n  
p r i nc ip l e .  HSE w i l l  ensure  
they do so  i n  p r a c t i c e .  
Safe ty  does n o t  happen auto- 
t i c a l l y ,  it m u s t  be worked 
on; FPA a r e  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  
it is wi th in  t h e i r  powers 
t o  ensure marine s a f e t y .  
Would accept  a lo-' c r i t e r i a :  
t h i s  has no meaning, however. 
unless  a q u a n t l t a t i v e  rzsk  
assessment is undertaken and 
sub j ec t ed  t o  open s c ru t i ny  
dur ing  t he  dec l s l on  process .  
No confidence i n  HSE, o r  
i ndus t ry  t o  guarantee  s a f e t y  
Risks appear unacceptable.  
LOCAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
ASPECTS 
Would aim t o  maximize l o c a l  
advantage by a s  much l o c a l  
recrui tment  of l abo r  and 
personnel as pos s ib l e .  
The employment and l o c a l  
wealth imp l i ca t i ons  a r e  
convincing. Important 
t h a t  t h e  whole package o f  
developments is considered 
(ng l  p l a n t ,  e t hy l ene  
cracker  and downstream 
i n d u s t r i e s )  ; ng l  p l a n t  
a lone  would warrant  
cons iderably  l e s s  
enthusiasm. 
-- 
To be assessed  i n  t h e  l i g h t  
of a l l  t h e  evidence, p a r t i -  
c u l a r l y  t h a t  o f  t he  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  
-- 
-- 
Unconvinced t h a t  de t r imen t a l  
impact w i l l  no t  a r l s e  
ENVIRONMENT 
These a r e  minimal and w i l l  be 
reduced a s  f a r  a s  pos s ib l e .  
Loss o f  amenity a t  Braefoot  
Bay a necessary s a c r i f i c e  -- 
o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  environmental 
impacts a r e  acceptable .  
-- 
A normal p lanning i s sue  t o  be 
decided i n  the  l i g h t  o f  a l l  
evidence and t he  imposi t ion  
of p l a ~ i n g  condi t ions .  
-- 
-- 
S i g n i f i c a n t  l o s se s .  
' NATIONAL BENEFITS 
Complementary -- both t he  
na t ion  and t he  o i l  
companies would ga in  
through e f f i c i e n t  w e  of 
North Sea resources .  
-- 
P r e s t i g e  a s  impor tant  ( i f  
no t  m r e  s o )  than more 
t ang ib l e  b e n e f i t s .  
TO be  a s se s sed  i n  t h e  l i g h t  
of evidence from the 
Departments of Energy/ 
Indus t ry  and Employment 
-- 
-- 
Accepts o v e r a l l  na t i ona l  
b e n e f i t  argument, bu t  
b e n e f i t s  not  s i t e  
s p e c i f i c .  No t rade-off  
t o l e r a b l e  between pub l i c  
s a f e t y  and economic 
bene f i t .  
3 i l  companies 
u t h o r i t l e s  
I 
I Department of ! ~ n e r g y /  
!Industry 
1 
Sco t t i sh  ! X v e l o p m n t  
Department ! 
I 
f 
!iiealth and 
:Safety 
:Executive 
3 
i 
i 
Che Forth 
? o r t s  
nu tho r i t y  
! 
The Action 
Sroup 
availability of a construction work force had been a n  important, though 
not overriding, consideration in site choice, partly because jobs entailing 
the housing of imported labour would probably take longer. Further- 
more, the large pool of unskilled manpower within traveling distance of 
the Mossmorran site made it an attractive location for downstream indus- 
trial development. Although Esso lodged planning application (c),  this 
had been done in order to pave the way for other industrialists to develop 
the site, not because Esso itself intended to do so. It was said to be in 
Shell and Esso's interest for these industries to become established, not 
least because t b s  would avoid considerable expense involved in export 
facilities for ethylene. It was also suggested that  permanent jobs in the 
NGL plant and ethylene cracker, although likely to be filled initially by 
non-local personnel, might boost house prices; moreover the high quality 
of employees were likely to enrich the communities in w h c h  they lived. 
4.2.3. Health and Safety 
Both companies took pride in their safety practices and record to 
date, and issued repeated assurances that no unacceptable risk would be 
posed by their intended developments. 
As a company, Esso is dedicated to safety and therefore all facil- 
ities or equipment required to safeguard the public and plant 
personnel will be installed. 
Esso, through many years of design and operating experience 
has the necessary technology, standards and practices to design 
and operate safely the ethylene plant a t  Mossmorran and the 
Braefoot Bay storage and loading facility. The company has over 
200 cumulative years of operating experience with similar facili- 
ties in Europe and other parts of the world. For over 30 years 
the company has been operating ethylene plants in Europe and 
other parts of the world, and in no case has there been a fire or 
explosion which involved members of the public. (Esso Chemical 
Limited, 1977) 
Aspects brought out in more detail in this report and the 
corresponding report by Shell (1977) and a t  the Public Inquiry included 
specific features of process design ( to be at least as good as current 
codes of practice, though with additional safeguards in view of recent 
incidents--notably Qatar),  site layout, possible interactions between each 
other's activities, bunding, construction, inspection and maintenance 
procedures, and high level of personnel training (being aware of the 
observation that 85% of industrial accidents appear to be due to human 
error).  Distances between the proposed installations and nearby com- 
munities, when compared with similar plants elsewhere in the UK 
(Fawley--300 meters) orm the world (Stenungsund, Sweden--750 meters, 
Cologne--900 meters),  appeared favorable. Possible hazards that might 
arise in specified circumstances were considered, though a quantitative 
hazard assessment had not been attempted a t  the outline planning stage 
because insufficient design detail was available. Moreover, Shell was said 
to have no support for quantitative risk analysis other than for sensitivity 
analysis. What had been attempted was to take some account of the 
consequences of certain events, and make an assessment, not necessarily 
quantitative, of the likelihood of these events occurring. 
When compared to other activities' accident rates (industry, agricul- 
ture) the record of the petro-chemical industry was outstanding. The 
loading arm at  Braefoot Bay was regarded as being the weakest link in a 
very strong chain. In general terms the fractionation and cracking 
processes to be undertaken a t  Mossmorran are ordinary. A number of 
relatively minor areas of uncertainty were admitted, but these were said 
to represent fine tuning rather than basic understanding of hazard pro- 
perties. 
4.2.4. Environment 
Good environmental management is a policy of both companies, as 
may be seen from their facilities elsewhere. However, it was ack- 
nowledged at  the Public Inquiry that if the development goes ahead, it will 
finish Braefoot Bay in its present form. 
4.3. THE SCOTTISH DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT 
Their statutory role in the decision process was to to advise the 
Secretary of State for Scotland on the decision he should make. This 
advice would be given in the light of all the available and relevant evi- 
dence. The Scottish Development Department commissioned a report on 
the visual impact of the proposed development, and made this available 
to parties. They also contributed to the cost of the Cremer and Warner 
report. 
4.4. DEPARTMENTS OF ENERGY AND INDUSTRY 
The summary of the national benefits given in Chapter 3 reflects the 
views of the Departments of Energy and Industry. It is relevant to add 
that although these Government departments thus endorsed the project, 
they had not endorsed the choice of the Mossmorran site, having offered 
no opinion either way during the decision process. Since the other 
dimensions are site specific there are no relevant official statements on 
them by this party. 
4.5 .  THE LOCAL AUTHORITlES: FIFE, DUNFERMLINE AND KIRKCALDY 
There is a good record of co-operation between Fife Region and its 
constituent District authorities and although planning committees and 
councils within each authority would necessarily have to ratify the propo- 
sals individually, the three authorities coordinated their consideration of 
the main elements of the proposals. It will be mainly a joint view that  is 
summarized here. For the two district authorities, Dunfermline and 
Kirkcaldy, t h s  was by far the largest planning application they had come 
across--a unique and interesting experience. Size itself was less unusual 
to the regional authority, but it was nevertheless an exceptional applica- 
tion. 
In Section 2.4. the local authorities were introduced mainly in terms 
of their administrative roles; in this section their policy background is 
also of interest, notably that of achieving the objectives of sustaining 
satisfactory levels of employment opportunity and diversification of the 
industrial base of the Region (Fife Regional Report 1976--and since t h s  is 
a statutory report, the objectives contained therein carry considerable 
weight). Mossmorran is one of only three industrial sites wi thn Fife 
region which could accommodate industrial development on a significant 
scale. In terms of environmental policy, Mossmorran lies wi thn an 
environmental improvement area, but environmental considerations are 
complementary to economic regeneration priorities. Braefoot Bay is 
included in a policy expressing the need to protect the coastline from 
sporadic and unregulated development. Environmental impact informa- 
tion is required in support of major planning applications. 
4.5.1.  National Benef i ts  
The local authorities are  not statutorally obliged to take account of 
national policy, unless specifically directed. 
4.5.2. Local Socio-Economic Ef fec t s  
As long as risk and environmental impact could be judged to be 
acceptable (this was considered to be so), there was little doubt that  an.y 
major industrial development application for central Fife (given its poor 
economic base) would be supported by the local auth0riti .e~. 
The fact that there were three and not only one planning application 
for the Mossmorran site is significant here. The initial approach was by 
Shell to build an NGL plant. Esso were known to be looking for a site for 
an ethylene cracker (which in turn had the potential to at tract  down- 
stream in.dustry), and the oil companies were specifically asked by the 
local authorities to submit their applications so that  they could be con- 
sidered simultaneously by the local authorities. Thus Esso were asked to 
submit not only the ethylene cracker application along side Shell's, but 
also an application for downstream industrial development on the same 
site. The hierarchy of uncertainty over commitment to build these facili- 
ties noted in Chapter 2 .1  was known to the local authorities. The last 
application was requested so that any potentially interested developers of 
such industry need have no fears of administrative delay, as planning per- 
mission would be already granted. Had the application been for an  NGL 
plant alone, individuals withn the local authorities may have been less 
enthusiastic in their support. 
The statement on employment potential summarized in Section 3 
was based on the joint report (Fife 1977) prepared by the three Directors 
of Planning for the three councils, and thus reflects their overall view. 
Various individuals expressed different levels of enthusiasm about job 
prospects. Provost Wood, Chairman of Dunfermline District Council was 
confident on this count and considered that the developments would 
"smash the 26% unemployment rate in the Cowdenbeath area." Others 
were less positive: "The N G L  plant alone would give a doubtful balance of 
advantage (of benefits against costs and uncertainties), the ethane 
cracker alongside only marginally better,  but these are necessary gam- 
bles given the possible prize of downstream industry, and the last will cer- 
tainly not materialize without the first two." There was no statement 
available from any individual (and none offered when asked specifically) 
about the degree of certainty with whch downstream industry was antici- 
pated. 
The argument that  operational phases of the NGL plant and ethylene 
cracker would poach key skilled personnel from existing industry, and 
thereby exert a negative employment effect found little sympathy withn 
any of the local authorities: poaching, if it occurred, would be considered 
to stimulate new recruitment rather than industrial closure (another 
gamble here, but apparently born out in other areas of recent oil related 
development in Scotland); lack of poaching would indicate the arrival of 
well paid immigrants to the region. Either way regional wealth would 
increase. 
In the construction phase the local authorities would ensure max- 
imum local employment by requir ix  that subcontractors consult with 
them so that,  where available, local skills would be used. 
4.5.3. Health and Safety 
Given the Peterhead "rehearsal.," (see Appendix I) the local authori- 
ties were aware in general terms from the start  of the potentially hazar- 
dous nature of the developments sought at  Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay. 
Their decision to appoint their own private consultants on hazard (Cre- 
mer and Warner) was to be an important one. This decision had been 
taken (via joint liaison between Fife, firkcaldy, and Dunfermline) in the 
informal consultation phase (mid-end 1976) so that when the application 
came in formally the necessary brief had been defined and Cremer and 
Warner could s tar t  work immediately. 
Use of Cremer and Warner (at  a cost of 45,000 pounds stg.) rather 
than the Health and Safety Executive (a t  no cost) deserves further ela- 
boration; it was supported by the local authorities on several counts (dif- 
ferent representatives mentioned different ones): 
1. The resources of the Health and Safety Executive were con- 
sidered to be too limited for advice at the planning stage (i .e. ,  
they were considered to concentrate their efforts on enforce- 
ment). 
2.  From other experiences the nature of the advice the Health and 
Safety Executive would offer was inflexible and did not match 
sufficiently closely the requirements of planners. 
3. Paid advice from private consultants would match the terms of 
reference required by planners, and result in the type of report 
the lat ter  would find most suitable. 
4. An advisory role by the Health and Safety Executive in the plan- 
ning process could conflict with their regulatory role of plant 
once built. 
5. There may be conflict if the local authorities rely on the same 
advisory body (i.e., the Health and Safety Executive) as the  
Scottish Development Department and Secretary of State. 
The Cremer and Warner report was written to a general brief asking 
advice as to the acceptability or unacceptability of applications (a) and 
(b) as regards hazard, including possible interaction effects and layout of 
elements in the proposed site, advice on the adequacy of information pro- 
vided by the applicants and possible recommendations for planning con- 
ditions. 
There was no statutory requirement that such a report should be 
prepared, but since hazard was a crucial element in the general cost- 
benefit balance of the applications a t  the local level, the local authorities 
sought outside expert advice on t h s  aspect, according to the brief indi- 
cated above. A small contribution to the costs of the report was made by 
the Scottish Development Department, as its findings in relation to appli- 
cation (a) ( a n  application of national significance) were of interest to this 
party 
The local authorities were fully satisfied with the Cremer and Warner 
report particularly in its suggestion of planning conditions and of a 
number of specific design details for the plant (insistence on fully redun- 
dant secondary containment; mounded storage; storage of propane and 
butane at Mossmorran rather than at Braefoot Bay). A much referred to 
statemen.t from the report 's conclusion was that: 
"...in the consultant's opinion, there is no reason to doubt tha t  
the installations proposed for Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay 
cannot be designed, built and operated in such a manner as to 
be acceptable in terms of environmental impact and community 
safety . . .  provided that  relevant and adequate safeguards are 
agreed and ensured." 
Faced with such a statement it is hardly surprising that the local authori- 
ties were less than convinced by contrary statements on safety being 
advanced by the local residents Action Group. 
The Cremer and Warner report was the most detailed on hazard 
prepared for the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision. It was not a 
comprehensive quantitative assessment, but an appraisal of various 
hazard characteristics of NGL plants and ethylene crackers of the general 
type that was to be built; there was some consultation with the oil com- 
panie? over design details likely to be used whch had not been specified 
in the planning applications. However, the lack of detail in the outline 
application was recognized to put a severe limitation on Cremer and 
Warner's assessment of hazards from the marine terminal at Braefoot 
Bay. Hazard probabilities were evaluated as small, remote, credible, etc. ,  
i. e . ,  essentially non-quantitatively. 
Although the Cremer and Warner report was the basis of the local 
authorities official view on hazard, not all hazard-related statements 
attributable to the authorities were founded in this report (this clearly 
could not be so before May 1977, and was not always so thereafter). The 
Cremer and Warner report had reassured them that an  acceptably safe 
plant in principle could be built. A view was expressed that as long as the 
plant would be built and operated as safe as reasonably practicable under 
the Health and Safety at  Work Act, given current design codes, and the 
specifications suggested by their consultants, (if necessary, planning con- 
ditions to the required effect would be stipulated--see section 5.6) risk 
would be acceptable. A statement to the Public Inquiry from one of the 
district councils summed up their position on hazard as follows: 
"The Kirkcaldy District Council must rest with the general con- 
clusions of their consultants, Cremer and Warner, that at  
Mossmorran it is reasonably clear from the evidence that there 
is no reason to suppose that the plants cannot be designed 
within acceptable hazard limits and a full hazard and operability 
audit is required as part of the conditions for detailed approval." 
Quantitative criteria were considered neither* necessary (the non- 
quantitative criteria used would be quite adequate) nor suitable (the data 
was not reliable; the council would not know how to interpret results any- 
way), and had not been stipulated in the Cremer and Warner brief. 
The local authorities were to make a further call on the advice of 
Cremer and Warner (1978a,b) in order to express an opinion on the 
radio-spark issue in the post-Inquiry perlod. Nothng arose in this respect 
that was considered to warrant any delay in official approval of the appli- 
cations. 
4.5.4. Environment 
Monitoring and planning conditions would ensure acceptable environ- 
mental impact, although there would be a small but unavoidable amenity 
loss a t  Braefoot Bay. 
4.6. THE FORTH PORTS AUTHORITY 
The Forth Ports Authority's main involvement was to judge the suita- 
bility from a ber thng and navigational point of view, of the Braefoot Bay 
site. They had had frequent meetings with the oil companies during 1976, 
studied various reports in relation to the Braefoot Bay site, and approved 
of its selection. Their early approval of the site had been a crucial factor. 
Following the selection of this site by the oil companies, the Forth Ports 
Authority had been asked by the Scottish Development Department to 
undertake an appraisal of 25 other potential marine sites on the Forth 
(Forth Ports Authority 1977). Ths  was the most detailed consideration of 
alternative sites available during the decision process and deserves sum- 
mary here, although it is restricted to a single aspect (shipping) and is an 
e z  post validation of the choice of Braefoot Bay. Braefoot Bay was shown 
to  be more suitable than any other (see Figure 4.1), lying east of the main 
Forth Bridges (thus avoiding additional piloting and navigational problems 
there), close to  the main shpping channel, but screened from it (and also 
from adverse weather conditions) by Inchcolm Island, with land suitable 
for development on the adjacent shoreline. Of the other 25 sites con- 
sidered, numbers 5, 6,  and 7 would have been the next most suitable, but 
were nearer the bridges, and had executive housing on the adjacent 
shoreline. Of the sites west of the bridges, numbers 19-25 were the only 
serious contenders (others were unsuitable due to their proximity to 
naval explosive anchorages and activities at the naval dockyard at 
Rosyth), but had the disadvantage of requiring extra dredging of the 
channel for larger ships, which might upset the hydraulic nature of the 
river. Sites east of Braefoot Bay lacked shelter and would require 
impracticable harbor facilities. 
A view expressed by the Forth Ports Authority on safety was that it 
was not somethng that happens on its own, but it is a subject th.at must 
be worked on. Their views on safety were not probed deeply at  the Public 
Inquiry, but from subsequent communications it is clear that various 
codes of practice and guidelines existed, and others would be set up, to 
ensure safe handling of vessels. As mentioned above, recen.t legislation 
(the Forth Ports Authority Order Confirmation Act 1980) strengthens 
their arm in respect of sched.uling shipping movements, designating 
routes and stipulating the condition of equipment. General directions will 
be issued nearer the time to ensure safe handling of Braefoot Bay vessels. 
The Authority are fully satisfied (and were at  the time of the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision) that they have sufficient power to 
ensure that gas tankers can be handled safely. Recognizing that absolute 
safety cannot be attained, various contingency emergency plans (fire 
fighting, evacuation) existed. 

The safety criteria used by the Forth Ports Authority were qualitative 
and reflected in the above. They were not asked for quantitative assess- 
ment, and did not consider one required; their record to date on safety is 
good. Berthing occupancy forecasts for the Braefoot Bay jetties (16-20% 
Shell, 45-50% Esso) allow significant reserve capacity, and a build up of 
vessels during bad weather was not foreseen, partly because conditions 
prohibiting s h p  movements would not last more than twenty-four hours. 
Although other parties (notably the Action Group) were to raise a 
residual concern over the Forth Ports Authority's regulation of naval 
vessels, the Authority were satisfied that  they have the power to stop 
such traffic. 
In order to contain potential environmental impacts of the Braefoot 
Bay activities, bunkering would be strictly controlled. Only liquid cargoes 
would be handled a t  the Braefoot Bay jetty. No undue interference with 
yachting was foreseen. 
4.7. THE HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE 
The phlosophy underpinning the Health and Safety Executive's sta- 
tutory functions (and, by implication, the Health and Safety a t  Work Act) 
is that  the prime responsibility for safety lies with industry (Robens 1972) 
and it would be inappropriate for such responsibility to be transferred to 
a regulating authority. Industry must demonstrate to  the Executive that 
it has the necessary technical and management resources to ensure that 
an unacceptable level of risk will not arise. Risk acceptability could not 
be precisely defined, as i t  was recognized that there will always be a resi- 
dual risk, so that judgments on risk acceptability in any particular case 
would be made in regard to the often extreme remoteness of the risk, the 
scale of disaster which could ensue and the cost of remedial measure i.e.,  
judgments would take account of reasonableness and practicability. 
Quantitative criteria were not necessarily considered appropriate. 
It is u.seful to distinguish the advisory role of the Health and Safety 
Executive during the decision process for a planning application, with 
their inspection and enforcement role for plant in operation or under 
construction. It is also important to recognize that their advisory role is 
not a fossilized one, but is evolvlng and adapting to changing cir- 
cumstances; Mossmorran should not necessarily be considered represen- 
tative of current practice (see section 7.7 for an indication of more 
recent practice). 
Their advisory role in the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay planning process 
was limited not only by a shortage of resources (thus they would not have 
had the manpower necessary to prepare an advisory report as extensive 
as that of Cremer and Warner's) but also (more importantly) due to their 
preference to reserve their substantial scrutiny of the safety of the pro- 
posed facilities until full design details were available. Ths  point was par- 
ticularly stressed in relation to application (c). The necessary informa- 
tion was not statutorally required during the decision process, (nor 
specifically requested by the Executive), and would not normally be 
volunteered or even prepared by operators until they had been granted 
outline planning permission Thus, the Health and Safety Executive's role 
at  the Public Inquiry was geared to making a judgment in principle as to 
whether the chosen type of installation when built on the chosen site, 
would be able to meet the Health and Safety at  Work (etc.)  Act and associ- 
ated regulations. Their written judgment on safety submitted during the 
decision process must be seen in this light, and is reproduced in Appendix 
4. 
Both the Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay sites were considered in prin- 
ciple to be good sites (in terms of their geographical features) and it was 
concluded that if each plant is designed, constructed, installed, operated, 
and maintained to  the hghest  standards currently available in the indus- 
try, no intolerable situation should be imposed within the site or in the 
surrounding neighborhood. 
The Health and Safety Executive were to be involved in the decision 
process a t  various stages: they were notified by the local authorities of 
the planning application; they presented their view at the Public Inquiry 
(as noted immediately above); they were centrally involved in considera- 
tion of the radio sparks issue; and they advised the Secretary of State in 
relation to appropriate planning conditions. Their most important role, 
however, would arise in "unseen" consultations and maintaining of the 
detailed design and construction of the plant and with scrutiny of the 
safety audit that  was to be stipulated as a planning condition. 
Their published statements on radio sparks issued during the deci- 
sion process were more exhaustive than those on all other safety factors. 
Two specific reports based on original field studies were issued in the 
course of their response to representations from the public (Health and 
Safety Executive 19?Ba,b). This apparently more thorough consideration 
should not be taken to reflect the considered relative importance of the 
issue, notably because: 
(a) the design of the plant would have to be such as  to  ensure that 
the probability of significant escapes was remote; 
(b) given an escape of gas a close ignition source (e.g.,  radio-spark) 
could prove fortunate; 
(c) there are several other ignition sources (e.g.,  flare stack) in the 
vicinity anyway. 
Other issues raised since the Inquiry were thought of rather greater 
importance, but statutory procedures prohibited open discussion of them 
(as they were not considered by the Secretary of State to be of a kind 
that had not been raised a t  the ~nquiry), and, they would in any case be 
fully assessed internally by the Health and Safety Executive before allow- 
ing the facilities to be commissioned. 
4.8. THE ABERDOUR AND DALGETY BAY JOINT ACTION GROUP 
Ths  was the main party opposed in principle to the developments 
4.8.1. National Benefits 
Of the four main dimensions, t h s  was of least direct concern to the 
Action Group. The national benefits were not strongly disputed, although 
on one occasion at  the Public Inquiry the point was made that,  due to the 
20%. government development grant and tax concessions on capital 
allowances available to the oil companies, each permanent job at  
Mossmorran (from the NGL plant and ethylene cracker) could cost the 
nation 1 million pounds stg.; this seemed a ludicrously expensive job 
creation project! 
4.8.2. Local Socio-Economic Benefits 
There was a certain amount of scepticism expressed over the extent 
of local economic benefits from the plant. The Action Group emphasized 
that ,  of the three applications, the NGL plant was the only one with a firm 
commitment by the company. Ths  plant alone would have doubtful 
economic benefit (as some local authorities had admitted--see section 
4.5). They also noticed that statements issued from time to time by Esso 
that  they expected to be able to give a firm decision on the ethylene 
cracker "withn about eighteen months" or "in the first quarter of next 
year" remained unconfirmed until October 1980 (fourteen months after 
official planning approval had been granted). Without the cracker, there 
would be no downstream industries (the most (only?) significant local 
economic bonus of the development, as it alone would match the semi- 
and unskilled unemployed of Cowdenbeath). Moreover the Action Group's 
reading of the world's plastic industries indicated that since there was 
existing overcapacity, and new plants under construction worldwide, 
including the Middle East, industrialists would be unlikely to be attracted 
to Mossmorran anyway. 
A further aspect on whch  the Action Group disputed the local 
economic benefits of the plant concerned the poachng of skilled labour 
from established industry in Fife. Higher salaries would attract key per- 
sonnel, and a brake would. be put on the expansion of existing industry; 
the result could be a net loss rather than a net increase in employment 
Given these factors, the Action Group considered that the local 
authorities were being far too gullible over oil companies' assurances on 
plant benefits, and there was more of a gamble than was being admitted. 
More serious than any gamble on employment, however, was a gamble on 
safety. 
4.8.3. Health and Safety 
By far the main thrust of the Action Group's objections related to 
hazard. In their view the statutory authorities were not (could not be 
seen to be) giving a competent appraisal of safety. A list of points sum- 
marizing and reflecting the Action Group's own view is given here. The 
first point underpinned the Group's very existence. 
1. The local authorities were not considered to be in a position to give 
an  adequate appraisal of safety, because 
a)  they were considered to lack the necessary internal technical 
skills; 
b) they could not be seen to be objective, given their initial 
immediate enthusiasm for industrial development at  Mossmor- 
ran: moreove.r, consultants appointed by them could not be seen 
to be impartial; 
c) officials and councillors of the authorities had accused the 
Action Group of irresponsible scaremongering without 
(apparently) first attempting to appreciate the basis of the 
Group's fears; and 
d) there was a general lack of response to safety issues put to 
them by the Action Group. 
2. Verbal reassurances on safety--of the type they were being offered 
by other parties--(whether offered by oil companies, Cremer and 
Warner, Local Authorities, Health and Safety Executive, or the Forth 
Ports Authority) were considered to be empty and meaningless given 
the tendency of "incredible" events (San Carlos, Qatar, Ab Qaiq, Das 
Island) and accidents (Flixborough, numerous oil/gas tanker 
incidents) to occur. Also, local residents considered themselves to 
have more to lose than any of these other parties, in the event of a 
disaster. 
3. Current design codes/modern technology/good manning practices-- 
apparently the cornerstones of the oil companies reassurances--were 
not found convincing--accidents happen in spite of them. Qatar had 
been a modern plant and the Action Group believed it to be a blue- 
print for Mossmorran (until its destruction in March 1977). 
4. Physical separation was argued to be the only safeguard against 
accidents given the uncertain level of knowledge and technology and 
the magnitude of a potential disaster. Both Mossmorran and Brae- 
foot Bay were said to be too close to neighboring communities ( 4  
miles was considered to be an  appropriate separation distance). 
Braefoot Bay (and associated marine activities) gave greater cause 
for concern because 
a) a severe accident there would directly affect Aberdour and Dal- 
gety Bay, and possibly other communities, including Edinburgh, 
b) it was regarded (by Cremer and Warner, and the oil companies) 
to be the weakest link, 
c) it had been less thoroughly assessed than other components in 
the Cremer and Warner report,  
d) they had been led to believe that evaporation rates and hence 
hazard potential posed by an unintentional release of gas over 
water were considerably greater than over land. 
e) the extremely narrow and sharp approach to the jetty, coupled 
with hazardous rocks and tides was consid,ered to make the 
navigation of the channel approach extremely dangerous, 
f) the Health and Safety Executive had told the public inquiry that  
marine considerations (i.e., beyond the loading arm on the 
jetty) were not mat ters  for their consideration. 
5. It was considered that  a full quantitative risk assessment could and 
should have been done before outline planning permission was 
granted. To grant permission in the absence of such an assessment 
was 
a)  to act  (apparently) without any yardstick of risk acceptability 
given the considered inadequacy of purely verbal criteria, 
b) to prevent open public scrutiny of any detailed assessment 
lacked both accountability to the population a t  most risk and, 
given their considered incompetence of statutory bodies, credi- 
bility. A suitable yardstick for risk acceptability would be 
however, it would need to be underpinned by an openly scrutin- 
ized quantitative risk assessment. 
Some time after the close of the Inquiry, the Action Group issued 
their own partial quantitative assessment of risk. It was partial in the 
sense that only the Braefoot Bay terminal (not other marine activities or 
Mossmorran) was considered. It was based on the methods of the Canvey 
Report (Health and Safety Executive 1978) and the procedure used was 
verified by the firm of private consultants Burgoyne and Partners. 
Results are given in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. These are plainly at variance with 
the "acceptable" standard agreed by other parties a t  the Inquiry, 
The Action Group concluded that  other parties (who were not on the 
whole exposed to the risks) were quite happy to talk in terms of vague 
generalizations or  even to accept that there is a certain minimum norm 
of public safety so long as there was no attempt to quantify the risk to see 
whether it satisfied the norm. 
6. The Cremer and Warner report whch  had been the main basis for 
both the local authorities judgment on safety was considered to be 
deficient in a number of important respects. 
7. There was considerable disquiet and resentment that the close of the 
Public Inquiry effectively meant the close of debate on safety, espe- 
cia1l.y in view of the amount of additional "evidence" that was to 
emerge. None of the issues raised by the Action Group during the 
post-Inquiry period except that  concerning radio sparks were given 
any response other than acknowledgement (including the report 
behnd  results in Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2. Risk Assessment: Braefoot Bay Berthng Facilities 
Location Distance Risk of Multiple 
from Jetty Fatalities 
(km) Per Year* 
Aberdour 1 1,000 x lo-6 
Dalgety Ray 1 1,000 x 
N. Queensferry 5.6 11 x lo+ 
S. Queensferry 7.2 89 x 
Hound Point (Dalmeny) 4.5 13 x 
Cramond 6.1 37 x 1 0 ' ~  
Granton 7.6 37 x lo-6 
Leith 9.8 19 x 
Burntisland 5.3 148 x 
7 - - - 
*An acceptable level is generally agreed a s  being one in a million per year. 
Source: Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group (1979); 
results verified in a private consultant's report. 
Perhaps most important was the Action Group's appraisal of their 
statutory guardians of safety, the Health and Safety Executive. 
a) their written evidence to the Public Inquiry was criticized for its 
superficiality (it is reproduced in Appendix 4); 
b) their treatment of the radio sparks issue in the post-Inquiry 
period was considered inadequate (see section 5.5); 
c) there appeared to be a number of inconsistencies in various 
Health and Safety Executive statements--a progressive disap- 
pearance of "one in a million" as an  acceptable level of risk; the 
size of maximum credible spills a t  Canvey Island in relation to 
those a t  Braefoot Bay; an apparent chan.ge of policy by the 
Health and Safety Executive over the scrutiny of marine activi- 
ties; the absence of a one mile "cordon sanitaire" a t  Braefoot 
Bay, but its advised implementation at Mossmorran. 
-57- 
Table 4.3. 
-4 1. Risk of major sp i l l age  a t  o r  near j e t t y  due t o  f ire/explosion = 8.4 x 10 pa 
- 5 (Chance of spillage/hazardous movement = 4x10 (Canvey) 
No. of laden movements = 210 pa ( P I )  
Chance of non-ignition a t  source = 0.1 (Canvey)) 
- 4 2. Risk of major sp i l l age  a t  o r  near j e t t y  due t o  co l l i s i on  = 10.5 x 10 pa 
- 5 (Chance of spillage/hazardous movement = 1 . 5 ~ 1 0  (Canvey) 
No. of laden movements = 210 pa ( P I )  
Chance of non-ignition a t  source = 0.1 (Canvey)) 
3. Risk of major sp i l l age  a t  o r  near j e t t y  due t o  escala t ion of minor 
sp i l l age  (ethylene only) = 7.5 x 10-4 pa 
- 5 (Chance of minor spil lage/cargo t rans fe r  = 3x10 (Canvey) 
No. of movements pa = 150 ( P I )  
Probabil i ty of escala t ion = 0.5 (Rasbank ) 
Chance of non-ignition a t  source = 1/3 (Canvey)) 
Total chance of major sp i l l age  not igni ted 
= (8.4 + 10.5 + 7.5) x pa 
- 4 
= 2 6 . 4 ~  10 pa 
Total chance of major sp i l l age  not ign i ted  a t  source 
- 4 
= 2 6 . 4 x 1 0  pa 
Wind fac tor ,  Dalgety Bay = 0.1 
- 4 
.'. chance of d i s a s t e r  a t  Dalgety Bay = 2.64 x l o  
Wind fac tor ,  Aberdour = 0.2 
- 4 
... chance of d i s a s t e r  a t  Aberdour = 5.28 x lo 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Hazard source (4)  - a sp i l l age  a t  j e t t y  which is  igni ted there  and i s  
large  enough t o  cause d i s a s t e r  a t  Dalgety Bay o r  Aberdour. Probabil i ty 
pa = 1.62 x 10'4 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Overall r e su l t s :  
-4 Probabil i ty of major d i s a s t e r  a t  Dalgety Bay = 2.64 + 1.62 = 4.3 x 10 pa 
-4 Probabil i ty of major d i s a s t e r  a t  Aberdour = 5.28 + 1.62 = 6.9 x 10 pa 
d) the Health and Safety Executive were not considered to be 
independent of government; as  civil servants it was considered 
that  they would always avoid adopting positions a t  variance with 
Government policy; they were also suspicious of collusion 
between the Health and Safety Executive and industry. 
e)  the expertise of the Health and Safety Executive on certain 
technical maters  appeared to the  Action Group to  be inferior to  
tha t  of Rasbash their own technical expert ,  notably over the  
behavior of open flammable cloud explosions and the  effective- 
ness (or  otherwise) of the natural land contours around Braefoot 
Bay to s b e l d  Aberdour and Dalgety Bay in the event of an  explo- 
sion a t  the jetty; 
f) the safety standards to be adopted by the  Health and Safety 
Executive did not look sufficiently stringent,  in  particular the  
lack of a cordon sanitaire a t  Braefoot Bay. 
4.8.4. Environment 
In the  early stages of their campaign (up to and including the  Public 
Inquiry) the Action Group vigorously opposed the applications on environ- 
mental  and amenity grounds. 
4.9. OTHER INDMDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Not all opposition to the developments was articulated through the  
Action Group, and not all support for the developments was expressed 
directly by the parties whose viewpoints have been summarized above. It 
would be impossible to  include all remaining viewpoints here--individual 
residents,  students and professional academics, the Church of Scotland, 
newspaper editorials, and so on--but some will be mentioned. 
4.9.1. The Population of Cowdenbeath 
T b s  was strongly in favor of the developments--a one time mining 
town, now severely run  down following massive local pit closures and per- 
ceiving significant job opportunities from the gas plant developments to 
ease their chronic unemployment problems. Many were possibly oblivious 
to  the technical hazard potential of liquefied gas, the employment bene- 
fits would more than compensate for* others,  and pride in  a long mining 
history--with its associated dangers--made any risk from modern presti- 
gious industry appear  quite negligible. 
4.9.2. The Population of Gray Park 
Gray Park is a small council estate  to  the edge of the Mossmorran 
plant. They had been. told initially that  they were outside the danger 
zone, and were therefore quite happy to s tay put.  The Cremer and 
Warner report ,  advising evacuation, changed their views, but they would 
be prepared to change again if experts could reassure them again that 
there was absolutely no danger. Their main concern was that they should 
remain as a community, re-housed en  bloc should the need arise (see 
Appendix 2). 
4.9.3. The Proprietor of St. Colme House 
St.  Colme House is a substantial dwelling lying within 540 meters of 
the proposed storage tanks a t  Braefoot Bay and with a direct view to the 
proposed jetty (consequently little shielding against an explosion there). 
The proprietor opposed the plant on grounds of environmental distur- 
bance and hazard potential, but would have to settle for financial com- 
pensation from the companies to enable her to  move from the property 
rather than convincing reassurances against possible fears. 
4.9.4. The Conservation Society (Edinburgh Branch) 
They opposed the planning applications on grounds which broadly 
coincided with those of the Action Group (with an additional plea for the 
conservation of North Sea resources), though the force and persistence of 
the latter's campaign on safety rather dwarfed that of the Conservation 
Society. As a local branch of a national environmental lobby their pres- 
ence deserves noting as they were the only representatives of such a 
national lobby; the campaign of opposition was otherwise exclusively 
locally mounted. 
4.9.5. Lothian Regional Council 
Lothian Region lies to the south of the Forth Estuary, its northern 
boundary coinciding with the southern shoreline. Apparently to the indig- 
nation of their colleagues in Fife, Lothian Regional Council expressed con- 
cern over possible fire and explosion hazards from marine activities in 
the Forth Estuary that might affect their own region. Their representa- 
tions met an  administrative stone wall, however, as they had been raised 
in Spring 1979 a t  too late a stage in the decision process--spring 1977 
during the statutory consultation phase was the time for objection. 
4.9.6. Crarnond Residents 
Influenced by Action Group publicity, this residents association from 
the south of the Forth also voiced objection on grounds of hazard, but 
again at  a relatively late stage in the decision process. Their view was 
communicated through their local Member of Parliament--one of the few 
M.P.'s who was to express scepticism over the developments--that the 
public inquiry had not made clear that a marine accident could easily 
cause casualties in North Edinburgh, and they therefore wanted an 
assurance that  approval would only be granted if an accident that would 
cause death or serious injury codd not possibly happen. 
4.9.7. Political Viewpoints 
Although not directly party to the decision process, the views of 
councillors and politicians as elected representatives of the population 
deserve comment. The main political parties--conservative, labour and 
liberal--supported the applications on principle, thus reflecting the 
majority view of their constituents (Aberdour and Dalgety Bay represent a 
relatively small fraction of the constituency). The (unelected) Scottish 
National Party candidates were more sceptical--both of employment pros- 
pects, reassurances on safety, accountability of the decision procedure, 
and justification of the final outcome--described by one SNP candidate 
(Scotsman letter,  15.8.79) as "cosmetic application of political wh-  
tewash. " 
There was no significant parliamentary discussion of the planning 
applications during the decision process, as this would have been 
improper. However, in a debate following the decision, a local labour 
party M.P. was to repeat a point he had made on earlier occasions, 
namely of the difficulties objector groups inherently face when mounting 
a campaign of opposition, irrespective of the merits of their case. Thus, 
the  procedural grumbles of the Action Group were not without sympathy 
from elsewhere. 
Although not a significant election issue at national government 
level, and the Action Group thus not politically aligned, the Action Group 
forced the planning applications to be an election issue at the local coun- 
cil elections by putting up their own candidate. It is reported that  he 
failed to win a seat by just three votes. The significance of this is difficult 
to assess, for although it would appear that  this candidate had some con- 
siderable support, characteristically low polls a t  local elections must also 
be recognized, thus a vigorous campaign on a single burning issue can 
capture a disproportionately large share of the total vote cast. - 
CHAPTER 5: 
THE DECISION PROCEDURES INVOLVED 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The diary of events that became the decision process was regulated 
by what statutory procedures allowed and how individual parties chose to 
exert their allowable role. The aim of t h s  chapter is to monitor the evo- 
lution of the decision process--divided into pre-, intra-, and post- Public 
Inquiry s tages--against a background sum,mary of statutory planning pro- 
cedures in the UK. 
5.2. A SUMMARY OF PLANNING PROCEDURES IN SCOTLAND* 
Under the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, any 
development of land (with a few exceptions which have no bearing on the 
present case) requires planning permission. Thus any party wising to see 
a particular site developed, whether it be a householder intending to 
build a garage adjacent to his house, or a multi-national firm intending to 
develop a 700 acre site, must lodge a formal planning application, g~ving a 
written description of the intended development accompanied by outline 
plans, with the local district planning authority. 
'Procedures in the rest  of the  UK are similar, but not identical, particularly in the position 
of the Region. 
The lodging of a planning application initiates three lines of activity 
by the district planning authority: (1) notification; (2)  publicity; (3)  con- 
sultation. These three activities are represented on the left hand side of 
Figure 5.1 and will be discussed in turn. 
5.2.1. Notification 
District planning authorities are obliged to notify higher levels of 
government (regional or national) about applications which raise issues 
that may transcend the district level. At their discretion, these higher 
level authorities may "call in" the application and determine whether the 
application should be approved (i. e . ,  outline planning permission should 
be granted, with or without conditions) or refused. 
The majority of planning applications received by district authorities 
are determined a t  the district level, and raise issues that are confined 
essentially to the site in questio'n. Applications whch raise issues of more 
than district significance, specifically if they are  contrary to or additional 
to ' the structure plan for the area, e.g., large industrial developments 
may be determined at the regional levels. Finally, the Secretary of State 
for Scotland may determine applications which raise issues of national 
significance (airports, power stations, large North Sea oil related develop- 
ments). 
Although it is thus possible to define three levels of development, 
those that qualify for district, regional and national determination 
respectively, it is not unusual for an  application that qualifies for regional 
determination to be passed back to the district level for determination, 
or national back to regional. T h s  is because in some cases district and 
regional, or district and national interests coincide, so that district deter- 
mination is suitable. As already discussed (see section 2.3) the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay planning applications were lodged a t  the dis- 
trict level (as are all planning applications) and determined a t  the 
national level. 
For applications which are successful, planning permission is 
granted, possibly subject to a range of conditions, which may be quite 
extensive. In the case of the Shell-Esso proposals, the planning applica- 
tion was supported by documents outlining their visual appearance, 
infrastructural needs (water, drain.age, road/rail access), economic and 
employment implications, and safety and pollution implications. It is 
suitable to include a t  this stage six general points about planning applica- 
tions: 
(1) Any development that is n.ot covered in the original applications 
and supporting documents (e.g. ,  an increase in plant capacity, a 
revised site lay-out) must be the subject of a separate planning 
application. Thus a proposal by Esso to re-locate the e thy1en.e 
cracker within the Mossmorran site (March 1980) was the sub- 
ject of a separate application. 
(2) For large scale projects (such as Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay) the 
granting of planning permission involves a two stage procedure, 
the first stage of whch culminates in the granting or refusing of 
outline planning permi.ssion ( i .e . ,  approval in principle). It is 
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this stage that ,  for the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay developments, 
corresponds to the decision process described in ttus case 
study. Outline consent is followed in a second stage (not 
reviewed here) by detailed consent. Once outline approval has 
been granted, it can be removed on very limited grounds of 
specified reserved matters; otherwise the Government can face 
very substantial compensation claims. Thus outline permission 
is, for many purposes, regarded as full permission. 
(3) The level of detail stipulated in the outline planning application 
in the two stage procedure has to be sufficient to establish the 
nature of activity proposed on the site, so that  the determining 
authority can establish in principle whether the site is suitable 
for accommodating the proposal. Design detail of the plant and 
specific support services that  will be required (so-called 
reserved maters) are usually not investigated until outline plan- 
ning permission for the overall development has been granted. 
T h s  order appears to meet both the interests of the developer 
and of the planning authority, as neither party will voluntarily 
undertake detailed investigations before approval in principle to 
the overall development has been given. Thus outline planning 
permission relates only to the principle use of the land, and not 
to any detail, even if this has been put in in support of the appli- 
cation. 
(4) Planning permissions are granted for the development of speci- 
fied activities on given sites and transfer of ownership of a par- 
ticular site thus generally entails transfer of planning permis- 
sion to the new owner. Thus Esso lodged application (c) (see 
Chapter 1) for downstream industrial development, in order to 
obtain industrial planning permission for the site rather  than for 
itself as a company. 
( 5 )  Conditions may be attached to planning permissions in order to 
regulate the developments proposed (e.g.,  re-visual, and other 
environmental impacts, hghways and access, plant capacity, 
and so on). Planning permission may lapse if development does 
not proceed wi thn a given time period. 
(6) Once an application has been called in by a higher level of 
government, the District Authority has no ultimate veto over the 
decision, and can therefore only present its case for or against 
the development alongside the cases of other parties to the 
decision. 
5.2.2. Publicity 
Under normal circumstances, if a decision is not made within two 
months of receipt of the planning application by the determining author- 
ity the applicant may appeal to the Secretary of State against deemed 
refusal and planning authorities aim to reach then decisions wittun this 
time limit. However, one of the statutory responsibilities of district plan- 
ning authorities, on receipt of any contentious planning application, i.s to 
publicize and advertise it to all parties which may be affected by it. This 
involves written correspondence with various organizations--neighboring 
councils, relevant government departments, local press advertisements, 
and local bill-posting. Projects for which significant interest and protest 
is thereby stimulated become candidates for a Public Inquiry--a forum in 
which arguments for and against the project can be presented in a 
manner in some ways similar to court proceedings (Town and Country 
Planning Act 1972, Scottish Development Department, 1975). The holding 
of a Public Inquiry can considerably protract the two month decision 
period indicated above. Proponents and opponents are able to put their 
own cases, and to cross-examine others, though all the evidence is sup- 
posed to relate specifically to the local planning issues involved; whle 
national policy issues can be referred to, the merits of Government policy 
cannot be discussed. 
There is no legal requirement that  projects which are candidates for 
a Public Inquiry (e.g., arouse significant controversy) are in fact subject 
to such an Inquiry unless it is requested by the applicant or the planning 
authority. Thus it would have been legally possible (though, in view of the 
extent of objections raised, politically very difficult) to determine the 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision without a Public Inquiry. The decision 
taker, the statutory planning authority or the applicant are the only par- 
ties with a legal entitlement to force a Public Inquiry. Thus for applica- 
tions for which significant controversy is aroused, the decision to hold a 
Public Inquiry is a t  the discretion of these parties, and not the objectors. 
Statutory notice of four weeks must be given to all parties between 
the announcement that an Inquiry will be held and its commencement. 
Postponement may be granted at the discretion of the Inquiry Reporter. 
Parties are encouraged to circulate as much written information as possi- 
ble in advance of the Inquiry in order to discourage "surprise" tactics. A 
memorandum of guidance was issued in 1975, and there are now inquiry 
rules. A pre-Inquiry meeting is often held in order to determine a suitable 
order of proceedings. The Inquiry hears the case of each party in turn 
(an  alternative procedure, though one which is not adopted, would be to 
hear each issue in turn), with cross examination by other parties, or, 
more usually, their lawyers; the latter increase the formality and expense 
of participation. 
The Inquiry is normally presi.ded over by a Reporter from the Scot- 
tish Office Inquiry unit (assisted in thls case by a technical assessor) who 
can put h s  own questions and cross-examine witnesses as he is responsi- 
ble for reporting back and making recommendations to the "decision- 
taker" (the Secretary of State).  He is also responsible for ensuring that 
all evidence is adequately examined and criticized. 
Following the Inquiry (whch may take a matter  of days, weeks or 
months, with or without adjournments), the Reporter if so asked circu- 
lates his summary of proceedings to all parties involved so that  they can 
comment on its accuracy, and then submits h s  summary along with his 
recommendations to the decision taker. Six months would be a reason- 
able time for this for a project of the scale of Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay. 
The decision is taken in the light of this report (the decision taker does 
not have to accept the  reporter.'^ recommendations), or any national 
policy issues and any new relevant evidence that may be brought to light 
after the close of the Inquiry which is of a kind that may have affected the 
Reporter's recommendations, had it arisen earlier. Such evidence must 
be notified to all parties who may submit written representations on it 
within 21 days. It is considered unnecessary for the decision taker to 
consider further representations on matters already aired a t  the Public 
Inquiry (whether or  not made by parties present a t  the Inquiry). Thus the 
Public Inquiry is the only opportunity for open public debate and the 
pre-Inquiry period can be particularly intense, with extensive lobbying, 
canvassing, and case preparation. The decision taker may, a t  his discre- 
tion, reopen the Inquiry; the re-opened Inquiry would not necessarily be 
confined to any "new" issue, but could hear additional evidence on issues 
already previously treated. 
The decision taker would normally be expected to announce his deci- 
sion within a few weeks (months in an involved case) of receiving the 
Inquiry Report. The report is published a t  the time of the decision. 
5.2.3. Consultation 
For large and complex planning applications, consultation with vari- 
ous external bodies (for example, concerning hazard and environmental 
impacts) and preparation of internal assessment reports (for example, 
concerning employment and social impacts) will generally be undertaken 
by district authorities before formulating their official view on the appli- 
cation. Detailed consultations as such will commence only after receipt 
of an official planning application. However, although not part of the sta- 
tutory process, i t  is normal practice for projects of the size of 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay for developers and local authorities to discuss 
the proposals before the formal submission of a planning application. 
Such an  exercise is directed initially at obtaining the basic information to 
enable the companies to decide whether the intended sites are suitable. 
At the same time it enables the planning authority to assess the nature of 
additional information that it  will itself require in order to be able to 
judge the suitability of the application; for example, whether any specific 
reports need to be written or commissioned on particular aspects. Thus 
consultations undertaken during the pre-application period enable a 
" more efficient processing of the formal application. 
The above three activities--notification, pu.blicity, and consultation-- 
occur simultaneously, and in combination. form the heart of the decision 
process. In the case of Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, they combined as indi- 
cated in Figure 5.2 (a modified PERT diagram), where Node 5 represents 
the lodging of the official planning application. Subsequent sections of 
this chapter discuss the pre-, intra-, and post-inquiry stages in more 
detail, leading to the final decision of approval. 
A further statutory requirement for the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay 
developments was the granting of a jetty license by the Forth Ports 
Authority. 
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5.3. PRE-INQUIRY ACTIVITY 
The period discussed in t h s  section is that between August 1976 
when the oil companies initially showed interest in the Mossmorran site, 
and May 1977, when the date of the Public Inquiry was officially 
announced (see decision diary, section 2.4). Formal planning applications 
were not lodged until January/February/March 1977, but there was a gra- 
dual sequence of both intra- and inter-party consultations throughout the 
pre-Inquiry period. The activities and consulations of the oil companies 
and local authorities will be summarized before describing the emer- 
gence of the objector groups. 
Following the abandonment of the Peterhead Public Inquiry (see sec- 
tion 2.1 and Appendix I ) ,  Shell undertook a search for possible alterna- 
tive sites for a natural gas liquids plant. Options on land a t  Mossmorran- 
Braefoot Bay were negotiated at  an  early stage. It was rumored that the 
landowners, rather than the local authorities were the first to know of the 
oil companies interest early in July 1976. However, Shell soon engaged in 
consultations with the local authorities in order to satisfy themselves of 
the suitability of Mossmorran to accommodate a natural gas liquids plant. 
Esso was a t  the same time seeking a site for an ethylene cracker, and it 
was immediately evident that Mossmorran could potentially accommo- 
date both types of plant. 
The siting criteria for a NGL plant summarized by Shell a t  the Public 
Inquiry we re: 
First, availability of an unrestricted deep water harbor withn 
practicable pipelining distance of the extraction plant a t  St. 
Fergus; second, availability of a site for the fractionation plant 
sufficiently near the harbor to allow development that was safe 
and economic as well as suitable in terms of environmental 
impact; and third, the desirability of locating the plant within an 
area already proposed for industrial development by the local 
authorities. It was desirable but not essential that the site for 
the fractionation plant should also be suitable for an ethane 
cracker. It was also desirable for the site to be situated in prox- 
imity of a construction labour force. 
Siting criteria indicated by Esso included safe and economic harbor facili- 
ties, and a location that cou1.d attract ethylene consuming industries; the 
latter criteria included both manpower and supporting services, and easy 
communication to markets in Europe and the UK. 
The informal consultations between oil companies and local authori- 
ties in these early stages, coupled with information about the earlier 
Peterhead applications, gave a firm indication to the local authorities as 
to the nature of information they themselves would need to  collect in 
order to be able to judge (i.e., support or oppose) the formal planning 
application. It was decided to appoint the private consultants Cremer 
and Warner to report on hazard and nuisance aspects, and for the author- 
ities themselves to undertake a report on economic and environmental 
impacts. The two resulting reports (Fife 1977; Cremer and Warner 1977) 
were the main written evidence that was used to justify the local authori- 
ties approval of the proposals in principle, and their suggestion of suit- 
able planning conditions. An October 1976 entry in the decision diary 
indicates that the local authorities position in relation to the develop- 
ments had been one of conditional approval from the start,  although the 
depth of considerations that could underpin t h s  approval was clearly to 
intensify as the decision procedure evolved. 
As well as consulting with the local authorities a t  this time, the oil 
companies were also in consultation with the Forth Ports Authority as to 
the suitability of Braefoot Bay for the marine terminal. The early appro- 
val and cooperation given by the Forth Port Authority was an important 
factor. 
Activities relevarit to  the eventual Mossmorran applications in the 
pre-Inquiry period were not confined to the Mossmorran site. Notably, 
there was some intra-party appraisal of possible alternative sites. I t  has 
proved difficult to get reliable information on t h s  aspect, but alternative 
site possibilities included the following five categories: 
1. In Spring 1977, the oil companies investigated other possible 
sites on the Forth Estuary. Braefoot Bay was considered to be 
the only suitable site for the marine terminal, Mossmorran was 
considered the best site for the process plant. 
2. The oil companies earlier appraisal of alternative sites in sum- 
mer 1976 is reported to have included possible sites on the 
Cromarty Firth (unavailability of construction workforce, unsui- 
tability of harbor, distance from ethylene derivative markets 
made this location unsuitable), the Firth of Clyde (proximity of 
nuclear power station, distance for feedstock pipeline, and dis- 
tance from ethylene derivative markets made t h s  location 
unsuitable), and expansions of existing petro-chemical com- 
plexes (Grangemouth, Teeside). The influence of the Scottish 
National Party a t  the time may have been one of the considera- 
tions in choosing a site in Scotland. 
3, The Scottish Development Department (1977) issued national 
planning guidelines whch indicate the suitability of particular 
locations to accommodate large-scale industrial sites-- down- 
stream petro-chemical development These may have aided the 
identification of contingency sites following the abandonment of 
Pe terhead. 
4. Various local authorities elsewhere in Scotland were apparently 
keen for Shell and Esso to show interest in their own region 
(including North-east Scotland, Banff and Buchan, Strathclyde). 
To this end they lobbied the Department of Energy to guide the 
companies in their direction, but without success. 
5 .  At the request of the Scottish Development Department, the 
Forth Ports Authority undertook a study of 25 other possible 
marine sites on the Forth.. Their report (see section 4.6) is 
overwhelmingly in favor of the site a t  Braefoot Bay. It is a post- 
hoc justification of the site (dated May 1977), and was not 
available a t  the time the planning applications for Mossmorran- 
Braefoot Bay were lodged. 
It was January /February/March 1977 before formal planning applica- 
tions were lodged with the district authorities. It has been observed 
above (section 4.4) that the local authorities were keen for all three appli- 
cations to be considered a t  once, as t h s  changed the complexion of anti- 
cipated impacts. Processing of the applications by the district authori- 
ties involved the three separate lines of activity outlined in section 5.2. 
(1) Statutory notification of the proposals to the Secretary of State 
for Scotland was followed by his "calling-in" of the applications 
(on 7th February 1977, 1st March 1977, and 5th April 1977 for 
the NGL plant, ethylene cracker and downstream industries 
respectively). The reasons given for the "call-in" were as follows: 
"The development proposals, whch are closely connected 
with the supply of North Sea oil and gas, appear to raise 
major policy issues of more than district or regional signifi- 
cance, and to have implications for the national as well as  
the local economy. They are likely to have an impact 
extending beyond the immediate sites and localities and to  
raise general issues relating to  the environment of the 
Forth Estuary." 
Thus the Secretary of State, rather than district or regional councils, 
was to determine the applications. 
(2) The planning applications were publicized, and generated. over 400 
objections, both by individuals and by organizations. Most of the 
objections received referred to more than one item of concern, and 
some were received by more than one local authority. Accurate 
analysis of the objections is difficult, but the main points raised are 
listed in Appendix 3 (after Fife 1977). Representatives of support 
were also received (in a petition of 87 signatories). 
(3) The two written reports (Fife 1977, Cremer and Warner 1977) 
required to support the local authorities own appraisal of the propo- 
sals were formally commissioned. These reports were issued in May 
19'77 and made available for public inspection. The main conclusions 
of th.ese reports have already been referred to (see Chapter 4.5) and 
entries in the decision diary (May 1977), reflect unanimous endorse- 
ment by the local authorities of the Shell/Esso proposals, subject to 
a number of planning conditions. 
In view of the extensive objections lodged against the proposals 
(eventually over eight hundred) the Secretary of State considered it 
appropriate to hold a Public Inquiry; notice of this was given on 6th May 
1977, and although originally to have opened on June 13th, was postponed 
for a fortnight a t  the request of the Action Group. The Regional and Dis- 
trict Councils each submitted their own recommendations and comments 
to the Secretary of State and gave evidence to the Inquiry in support of 
the projects. 
Paralleling the above levels of official activity was that of individuals 
and organizations opposed to the proposals. Local residents opposition 
was stimulated with the first rumors that Shell/Esso were interested in 
the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay sites. The first concrete reflection of this 
can be found in local residents associations meetings in Aberdour and 
Dalge ty Bay (October-November 1976), but there had been earlier indica- 
tions in the press of the nature of the proposed activity, and the opposi- 
tion it was likely to arouse. 
According to press reports at the time, initial promotional meetings 
between oil companies, local authorities and the public (December 1976) 
appear to have done little to allay fears or reduce suspicions of some of 
the local residents. The latter were unconvinced by oil-company 
assurances on safety and environmental aspects, and suspicious that the 
local authorities were so enthusiastic about the employment prospects 
from the developments, that  it would be impossible for them to make an 
objective assessment of safety factors. Moreover the appointment of the 
private firm, Cremer and Warner, as consultants on safety was little reas- 
surance in this respect, as the mistrust of local authority figures by local 
opponents extended to a mistrust of any experts that these figures might 
themselves appoint. 
The Joint Action Group was formed in February 1977 to coordinate 
local residents opposition. As already noted, this was to be the main 
opposition to the application. Various pamphlets publicizing their con- 
cern were issued, alongside extensive canvassing, exhibitions, and lobby- 
ing of officials; the latter activity found little sympathy. 
The decision diary in Section 2.4 reflects events during t h s  time. 
Activity during the first half of 1977 was directed towards presenting a 
convincing case of opposition a t  the Public Inquiry. Professor Rasbash at  
Edinburgh University had offered his services to the Action Group as their 
main expert witness on fire and explosion hazard. The activities of other 
individuals and organizations during the pre-Inquiry period are'less well 
documented. The planning applications and issues they raised received 
steady coverage in the press (notably the Scotsman; also local newspa- 
pers) 
5.4. THE PUBLIC INQUIRY 
The terms of reference for the Public Inquiry were indicated in a 
letter from the Scottish Development Department dated 1 June 1977. 
This listed a number of general issues which the Secretary of State con- 
sidered to be of major importance and whch  should therefore be 
"brought out" at the  Inquiry. 
(1) The safety of the proposed. operations and plant at Mossmorran; 
(2) The safety of the marine terminal, loading and shipping opera- 
tions at Braefoot Bay, and of the linking pipelines to Mossmor- 
ran; 
(3) the effect of the Braefoot Bay terminal on the environment, 
amemty, recreational activities, community development, and 
employment growth in the vicinity; 
(4) The suitability or otherwise of other potential marine sites and 
means of providing loading facilities; 
(5) the level of gaseous emissions in normal operation and any 
effects on human, animal and plant life; 
(6) the probability of downstream development occurring at  
Mossmorran and the nature and expected effects on employ- 
ment of such development; 
(7) the extent to which any benefits of the proposals will offset any 
adverse environmental, economic, and social effects, having 
regard not only to the immediate vicinity but also to Fife Region 
and the Forth Estuary in general. 
The above list was not intended to be exhaustive and it was recognized 
that there would be other issues which parties might wish to raise at the 
Inquiry. In effect, all but the merits of national policy could be debated; 
the place for the latter,  though, was Parliament. 
The Secretary of State also welcomed recommendations from the 
Inquiry of a kind whch  might be imposed as planning conditions. 
It can be seen that  the terms of reference for the Public Inquiry are 
loosely defined. The depth of consideration to be given to the various 
relevant aspects would depend on individual parties involved. There were 
no pre-defined yardsticks for assessing any of the dimensions. Party 
activities in turn would be constrained by information available to them 
before the Inquiry; their own level of expertise; time available to digest 
this information; digestion of arguments a t  the Inquiry; directions by the 
Reporter. The Public Inquiry is some thing of an adversarial encounter 
between proposers and opponents to a planning application. The Inquiry 
Reporter's recommendations are based on his evaluation of the resulting 
exchanges. 
A pre-Inquiry meeting was held (June 1977) in order to establish a 
batting order so that  parties would know on which days they would be 
required, to circulate available representations and ask for others to be 
made avai.lable, and acquaint parties with the procedures to be adopted. 
The Inquiry sat on eighteen days, between the 27th June and 21st 
July 1977. The Inquiry Reporter was Mr. A.G. Bell, Deputy Chef Reporter, 
Scotland. The parties represented were: 
For the proposals: 
Shell 
Esso 
Fife Regional Council 
Dunferrnline District Council 
Kirkcaldy District Council 
Against the proposals: 
Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group 
Donibristle Investments Ltd (Developers of Dalgety Bay New 
Town) 
Gray Park Tenants Association 
The Conservation Society 
Various Yachting Interests 
About forty individuals 
"Independentsu* 
The Health and Safety Executive 
Cremer and Warner 
The Forth Ports Authority 
Representatives of local political parties 
The views expressed by the main parties involved are reflected in Chapter 
4. 
Written reports on safety available at  the Public Inquiry were as fol- 
lows: 
1. Shell: Environmental and Hazard Survey Report, NGL plant 
2. Esso: Environmental and Hazard Survey Report, ethylene 
cracker 
3. Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group: Preliminary 
technical report. 
4. Conservation Society: Report on safety and environmental 
aspects by John Busby. 
5.  Health and Safety Executive: Statements of evidence by Messrs 
Offord and Foster (see Appendix 4). 
6. Cremer and Warner: Hazard and Environmental Impact Report. 
7. Rasbash: Written statement of evidence. 
Of these, the Cremer and Warner Report was the most extensive. 
The Reporter appears to have had little hesitation in recommending 
that outline planning permission for the proposed developments should 
be granted (see Appendix 5 for his conclusions). A number of planning 
conditions had been suggested by the local authorities and these in gen- 
eral were later to  be reflected among the statutory planning conditions 
which accompanied the Secretary of State's decision of approval. 
'Independent in the sense that  these parties were not advocating the  proposals, although 
none spoke against them. 
5.5. POST-INQUIRY ACTMTY 
Activity following the Inquiry looked set  to follow the normal course 
of events (the Reporter summarized the proceedings and submitted his 
recommendations to the Secretary of State in November 1977), until 
December 1977, roughly at  the time when the decision had been 
expected, the Action Group publicly raised the issue of possible ignition 
hazards due to break sparks from radio transmissions. (The issue had 
apparently already been raised by the Scottish Development Department 
and Ministry of Defence in a different content, as these bodies were study- 
ing a similar issue which had arisen a t  a defense establishment 
elsewhere--Cramond, near St. Fergus). As t h s  was an issue that had not 
been touched on at the Inquiry, the Secretary of State deemed it 
appropriate to invite for his consideration any representations which any 
of the parties might wish to submit to  him on the matter. The Action 
Group's initial representation on radio-sparks along with a let ter  in 
response from the Health and Safety Executive were accordingly circu- 
lated to all parties on 29th March 1978 inviting their comments withn a 
period of 28 days. This was to be the first of five rounds of correspon- 
dence on this issue, with a further sixteen months or so before the final 
decision was announced. This is a remarkably long time when one recalls 
the stated urgency of an  early decision. These rounds are listed in the 
decision diary (section 2.4). 
Although a number of other representations unconnected with 
radio-sparks were received by the Secretary of State, none was con- 
sidered to raise significant new issues of a kind which had not already 
been discussed a t  the Public Inquiry and therefore required (and were 
given) no response other than acknowledgement. Thus the provisional 
decision of approval announced on 29th March 1978 was provisional only 
on the issue of radio-sparks. 
Much of the correspondence of this post-Inquiry period has been 
made available by the Scottish Development Department, and this has 
contributed to the picture that  emerges of the positions of the main par- 
ties a t  t h s  time. 
The local authorities' made representations on radio-sparks based on 
further reports commissioned by them on t h s  aspect from Cremer and 
Warner (1978a,b). There was no substantial change in their earlier posi- 
tion, and they expressed their eagerness for the Secretary of State to 
verify formally his provisional decision of approval. 
The Health and Safety Executive's response was based on their moni- 
toring of field experiments--apparently undertaken by Shell--and i.ncluded 
further written reports (1978a,b), and it was the undertaking of these 
that  was the most time-consuming aspect of post-Inquiry activity. 
Other individuals and organizations, faced with the opportunity of 
correspondence with the Secretary of State, augmented any comments 
they may have had on radio sparks with others on different aspects of the 
development and of the decision process; most prominent here were 
repeated calls from the Action Group, and sympathizers, for the Inquiry 
to be re-opened. Press reports monitored the exchanges from a d.istance, 
garnished with rumors that the oil companies would pull out if the delay 
continued much longer--certainly the hope of the Action Group, but 
nowhere substantiated. 
The main evident post-Inquiry interaction was in the form of an inter- 
rupted dialogue, coordinated through the Scottish Development Depart- 
ment between the Action Group and the Health and Safety Executive. Dis- 
satisfaction on the part of the objectors with successive responses from 
the Health and Safety Executive generated further rounds of correspon- 
dence. The process was terminated rather than resolved with the Secre- 
tary of State's decision in August 1979. A number of interesting aspects 
emerge from this period. 
1. The fact that  the question of radio-sparks emerged within six months 
of what was supposed to have been an exhaustive inquiry based on 
supposedly thorough technical assessments was taken by the Action 
Group as an illustration of 
(a) a general lack of knowledge of the extent of the hazard posed by 
the planned facilities; 
(b) the view that little (no) confidence could be placed in the judg- 
ment of so-called experts. 
2. That more than one round of correspondence between themselves 
and the Health and Safety Executive ensued generated accusations 
from the Action Group that  the Executive were being "slipshod and 
incompetent in carrying out the procedural parts of their studies 
and untrustworthy in interpreting the results" (Sutcliffe 1979). This 
reinforced the Action Group's earlier view that no confidence could 
be placed in any of the Health and Safety Executive's advice, and 
decisions based on it would be likely to be faulty in respect of safety. 
A different view would be that  the Health and Safety Executive were 
simply setting out to provide a considered response to every com- 
munication passed on by the Secretary of State. The Action Group 
(and their immediate sympathzers) were alone in their lack of confi- 
dence in the Health and Safety Executive. 
3. The fact that so much attention was given to the radio-sparks issue 
gives a striking imbalance to the range and depth of safety con- 
siderations. Ths  is all the more surprising when it is realized that 
all parties (both proposers and objectors) considered the issue, in 
itself, a relatively insignificant one. 
4. A re-opening of the Inquiry, to enable a more di.rect dialogue between 
parties on the issue of radio-sparks, was officially said to have been 
inappropriate on two main counts. Firstly that t h s  would have had 
no effect on the necessary field experiments which were the most 
time consuming aspect of the post-Inquiry activities. Secondly, that a 
re-opened Inquiry would enable aspects other than radio-sparks to 
have been brought out, and the Secretary of State had already 
decided that  these had been sufficiently aired a t  the original Inquiry. 
Thus the Secretary of State considered that the sparks issue could 
most appropriately be handled through written correspondence. 
There were repeated calls from objectors for the Inquiry to be re- 
opened, and the objectors considered it "unorthodox" that this had not in 
fact happened (see below). There was a considerable amount of strained 
correspondence between the Action Group and the Scottish Development 
Department-alternately punctilious and desultory. There appears in par- 
ticular to have been some difficulty over the Action Group being denied 
access to certain relevant documents (notably the Excel1 report--see 
diary above, June 1978) and in a n  unreasonably short time being given for 
their comments (weeks for the Action Group, months for the Health and 
Safety Executive). In two cases successful appeals to court were made or 
threatened against the Scottish Development Department to clear up 
these matters. 
The delay served its own function for the Action Group. It saw 
(1) increased support for its cause--from academics, (including Pro- 
fessor Fay of MIT, a "known" figure in this field) Lothian Regional 
Council, and resident associations South of the Forth, and media 
coverage (numerous newspaper articles and three television 
programs which generally favored the objectors rather than the 
proposers standpoint--see Table 5.1); 
Table 5.1. Reports on radio sparks. 
New Scientist (1978) I Not specific t o  Mossmorran Excell ( 1978) 
Cremer and Warner (1978a,b) 
Health and Safety Executive (1978a) 
Sutcliffe (1980) 
Also, letters and technical notes written by the Action Group 
and the  Health and Safety Executive a t  various times. 
(2) a mass of what the Action Group considered to be "additional 
evidence" (see Table 5.2) notably their preparation of a partial 
quantitative risk assessment and its methodological verification 
by Burgoyne's ( a  firm of private consultants); 
(3) the continued hope that their cause was not lost as long as the 
decision had not been taken. 
This hope was lifted when the conservative general election. victory in May 
1979 saw George Younger succeed Bruce Millan as Secretary of State for 
Scotland, with the promise that he would review the Action Group's addi- 
tional evidence before announcing his decision. A visit by Action Group 
representatives to the national parliament in Westminster was also made. 
The sympathetic hearing they received was little comfort for the final 
Table 5.2. Items of "Additional" evidence raised 
by the Action Group. 
decision of approval to Shell and Esso's planning application that  was 
given in August 1979. 
The role the post-Inquiry delay served for other parties is reviewed in 
Chapter 6.3.  
Notable reports isrrued since 
the Public Inquiry 
Health and Safety Executive 1978b (Canvey) 
General Accounting Office 1978 
Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint 
Action Group 1979 
Gugan 1979 
5.6. THE DECISION OUTCOME AND ITS OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATION 
Hajoi' 1.e.g. incidents 
San Carlos 
Ab Qaig 
Qatar 
Das Island 
The following extract is taken from the letter giving the Secretary of 
State's decision of approval issued on 9th August 1979. 
1. The Secretary of State has had no difficulty in accepting that ,  
from the  land use point of view, the Mossmorran site is suitable 
for the developments proposed there. On the other hand he 
agrees that the  site proposed for the related marine terminal a t  
Braefoot Bay would not normally be regarded as an  appropriate 
location for such development in view of the adverse effects on 
the environment and the area's recreational value. Only an 
overriding case of need in the national economic interest could 
justify permitting a marine terminal at  Braefoot Bay in face of 
the amenity objections, even though detailed planning condi- 
tions in relation to development there would reduce the adverse 
environmental effects. The evidence and the Reporter's conclu- 
sions have therefore been assessed very carefully in order to 
determine whether such need for this particular site sufficiently 
outweighs these objections. No convincing evidence has 
emerged to support an assumption that a better site for a 
marine terminal could be found which would adequately serve 
the need.s of the  proposed NGL plant. The Mossmorran site is an 
acceptable location for the building of an  NGL plant and no more 
suitable site has been shown to exist for an associated marine 
terminal. The Secretary of State therefore feels bound to con- 
clude that the demonstrated need for the marine terminal 
development at  Braefoot Bay decisively outweighs the amenity 
objections. In reachng this conclusion the Secretary of State 
has had regad to the need, in the national interest to make pro- 
vision for NGL separation plant facilities to take advantage of, 
and avoid wasting, the very large gas resources of the Brent 
field. Having accepted that there is justification for allowing 
terminal facilities for the NGL plant a t  Braefoot Bay, the Secre- 
tary of State considers it right to permit there also the provision 
of terminal facilities for the ethylene product of the proposed 
ethane cracker a t  Mossmorran since there are decided 
economic advantages in having an NGL separation plant and a 
cracker located in proximity to one another, and use of the 
Braefoot Bay site makes this possible. 
2. The most contentious issue raised in the evidence has undoubt- 
edly been the question of hazard arising from a possible major 
spill of product at  Mossmorran, Braefoot Bay or from one of the 
connecting pipelines. Unlike the amenity objections discussed 
above, there can be no question of economic need for the 
developments being balanced against t h s  factor: considera- 
tions of public safety would automatically rule out the develop- 
ments if it were shown that they would give rise to an  imaccept- 
able level of hazard. 
3.  The Secretary of State is satisfied that the plants can be 
designed to operate within an acceptable level of hazard. He has 
arrived at  this decision on the basis of the report of the Public 
Inquiry and consideration of all the representations received fol- 
lowing it does not lead him to depart from that.  As far as tech- 
nology is concerned, there is nothing novel involved in the 
processes to be carried out. The Secretary of State considers 
that full allowance can be made for the hazardous nature of th.e 
products involved by appropriate design of the installations at  
Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay. In 'reachng this decision the 
Secretary of State has noted the difference of opinion that was 
voiced a t  the Public Inquiry and in the representations after it 
about the safety standards .which should be applied to a develop- 
ment of t h s  kind and has given careful consideration to them. 
He has noted however that  Health and Safety Executive have 
advised, the most recent occasion being 6 March 1979, th.at on 
the information available to them they believe that the proposed 
developments can be constructed and operated so as to comply 
with current health and safety legislation.. If the Health and 
Safety Executive assessment of the detailed design shows that 
the proposed development does not m.eet the required standard 
then powers are available to them under the  Health and Safety a 
Work Act to take appropriate action. The Health and Safety Exe- 
cutive wi.11 be involved throughout the planning and cornmission- 
ing of the plant and have the power under the Health and Safety 
a t  Work Act to issue an  improvement or prohibition notice where 
there is observed or anticipated a t  contravention of the relevant 
safety provisions. Should a doubt as to the safety of the plant 
emerge a t  any stage of its design or operation the Health and 
Safety Executive, whose view of the importance of safety is 
shared by the Secretary of State, would not hesitate to use their 
powers. As mentioned in paragraph 11 above the Secretary of 
State has now imposed a condition under which he must also be 
satisfied that  a full independent hazard audit has been carried 
out and, in the light of it and of the safety level revealed by the 
detailed study of the plant's design, that  the plant and the ter- 
minal can be operated a t  an acceptable level of safety. The 
Secretary of State considers that  with such a strong and con- 
tinuing statutory safeguard in existence together with the 
requirement for a full hazard audit to his satisfaction there 
should be no question of a unacceptable risk emerging as a 
result of the development. Until there is a detailed design, the 
question of safety of the plant cannot finally be determined. 
4. The Reporter recommended that as an  additional safeguard the 
ethylene storage tanks a t  Braefoot Bay (like the NGL storage 
tanks a t  Mossmorran) should incorporate fully redundant secon- 
dary containment--that is double containment tanks the outer 
wall of which is capable of withstanding the rupture of the inner 
wall. The Secretary of State accepts that this should be made a 
condition of planning permission. 
5 .  The Secretary of State accepts the final advise of Health and 
Safety Executive on the question of radio transmissions. This 
was given 6 March 1979 and stated that the further work whch 
had been carried out by them reinforced th.eir earlier view that 
the possibility of radio frequency sparks is low and the prababil- 
ity .of such sparks igniting concentrations of flammable sub- 
stances which happen to have spilled a t  the sites is even lower. 
Provided that  the recommendations outlined in the Health and 
Safety Executive report of July 1978 were fully implemented the 
radio frequency hazard would in the view of Health and Safety 
Executive be insignificant. They therefore saw no reason on the 
grounds of hazards from radio transmissions why the proposed 
development at Braefoot Bay and Mossmorran should not be 
permitted. In deciding to accept t h s  view the Secretary of 
State has taken account of the representations recei.ved subse- 
quent to 12 March 1979, when the Secretary of State circulated 
further material to parties. None of the representations 
received on the questions of radio transmissions since the clos- 
ing of the inquiry therefore leads the Secretary of State to 
depart from the conclusion that planning permission should be 
granted. 
In addition to the above justification for the decision of approval, 
forty-eight planning conditions were stipulated for the natural gas liquids 
plant (application (a), chapter 1) ;  an almost identical set  of conditions 
was stipulated for the ethylene cracker (application (b)). These were, of 
course, additional to the terms of any other approvals received under 
other statutes and included general conditions on plant size (a  maximum 
nominal annual intake capacity of 2.14 million tons for the natural gas 
liquids plant, and a maximum nominal capacity of 0.6 million for the 
ethylene cracker), restricted use of the Braefoot Bay jetty for piped pro- 
ducts, provision of a master plan and expected construction time, and 
provisions for temporary site works. Also included were conditions on 
highways and access; visual impact; infrastructure; water, air and noise 
pollution; and seven hazard/safety conditions, whch are repeated here in 
full. 
1. A full independent hazard and operability audit in relation to the 
design and construction of the NGL feedline wi thn the site, NGL 
plant, product pipelines and terminal facilities shall be carried 
out to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State prior to the 
commissioning of the plant. Operation of the facilities shall not 
begin until any requirements of the Secretary of State in the 
light of this audit have been complied with. 
2. The fire fighting facilities at  Mossmorran shall be designed, 
instabled and maintained to  the satisfaction of the planning 
authority in consultation with the Firemaster and the Health 
and Safety Executive. 
3. Operation of the Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay facilities shall 
not be commenced until such time as any measures considered 
necessary by the Secretary of State have been carried out to 
deal with any possible hazard effects of radio transmissions on 
the facilities. In particular comprehensive tests to determine 
electro-magnetic field strengths and levels of power induced in 
site structures shall be conducted on the proposed plant during 
its construction, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State. 
Where such tests confirm the need, safeguards and monitoring 
devices shall be installed to the satisfaction of the Secretary of 
State on any of the plants where t h s  is found or thought to be 
necessary. 
4. Arrangements a t  the Braefoot Bay terminal for the pumping of 
water for fire fighting shall be designed and installed to the 
satisfaction of the planning authority in consultation with the 
Firemaster, the Forth Ports Authority, and the Health and 
Safety Executive. 
5 .  Adequate manning procedures and equipment to the satisfaction 
of the planning authority in consultation with the Forth Ports 
Authority and the Health and Safety Executive shall be used at 
all times during the loading of liquid petroleum gas and natural 
gasoline tankers at Braefoot Bay. 
6. Access to the Braefoot Bay terminal and jetties shall be res- 
tricted to authorized personnel only. 
7. The venting of propane or butane to the atmosphere from ship's 
tanks shall not be permitted a t  the Braefoot Bay termlnal 
except in emergency circumstances. 
In an  effort to expose what in their view was the injustice of this deci- 
sion, in October 1979 the Action Group lodged a court appeal against the 
Secretary of State's decision on procedural grounds ( to the effect that 
the Secretary of State failed to exercise proper judgement in the way 
aspects of safety could be considered on a planning application). The 
Court was forthright in its rejection of t h s  appeal. 
CHAPTER 6: 
PARTY PERSPECTIVES ON ELEMENTS 
OF THE DECISION PROCEDURE 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Although it is possible to infer from previous chapters various party 
perspectives on different aspects of the decision procedure, it is the 
intention in this chapter to review procedural aspects more comprehen- 
sively. 
6.2. TIMING AND DYNAMICS 
The decision diary (section 2.4) reflects the actual sequence of 
events to emerge, and although moulded In general terms by the Town 
and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, this Act leaves a certain 
amount of leeway as  to what could have evolved. It is therefore useful to 
consider how party roles and hence decision dynamics, may have been 
influenced not only by statutory planning procedures, but also by parties' 
own internal policies and options; external constraints in terms of time 
and resources (money and expertise), the roles other parties were play- 
ing. 
1. The depth to which various issues could be debated a t  any stage 
during the decision process was dictated to a large extent by 
the level of detail of plant design released by the oil companies. 
Thus the Cremer and Warner report related to a generic natural 
gas liquid plant and generic ethylene cracker rather than the 
specific plantlcracker that would necessarily be built a t  
Mossmorran. Although Shell's plans were relatively advanced, 
little specific design detail about the cracker had been released 
a t  the time the report was prepared. "Esso's plans are in a s tate 
of flux and few, if any, details are finalized" (Cremer and Warner 
1977). Moreover, planning procedures do not require specific 
plant design details to be known in order for outline planning 
permission to be granted (unless a statutory authority specifi- 
cally calls for such details), as the question a t  issue is whether 
the process or activity is suitable in principle for the site 
chosen. This suits the developers who are said to require 
guaranteed planning permission before investigating final design 
details and giving definite commitment to building the plant ( i t  
was late 1980 before Esso were firmly committed to the ethylene 
cracker) and appeared to be satisfactory to the local authori- 
ties. There are said to be many pitfalls in having too much 
detail a t  too early a stage; notably that it may result in plans 
being frozen to a less than optimal design. On the other hand i t  
could be argued that amendments to an initial design could be 
submitted as and when necessary. 
The level of detail available severely limited the contribution of both 
the Health and Safety Executive and the Action Group. The former were 
unwilling to comment in detail on generic plants; their detailed scrutiny 
of plant safety would only be carried out specifical.ly in relation to the 
actual plant and they accordingly made a particularly mod.es t contribu- 
tion a t  the Public Inquiry--t.o the dismay and derision of the objectors. 
The Executive could have reserved their judgment un.til greater detail 
became available (i .e. ,  requested that adequate detail became available 
within a given time, period as has more recently been done) but did not 
consider it necessary to do so, given the fact that they were to monitor 
the release of reserved matters, and given the forthcoming safety audit in 
the planning conditions. 
The Action Group's self-chosenpurpose of attempting to increase the 
depth to w h c h  safety considerations would be openly debated in the plan- 
ning process was accordingly severely frustrated by the level of design 
detail required. In particular, their* call for a quantitative risk assess- 
ment a t  the Public Inquiry was said to be impossible to answer. 
2. Since the  Public Inquiry would be the only occasion for open 
interparty involvement in the decision process, it was vital that 
all aspects about which parties wished to present a case were 
brought out to the required depth. The required statutory 
minimum notice for a Public Inquiry is four w-eeks. The Action 
Group considered that this immediately put them at  a disadvan- 
tage. Of all the main parties, they alone would be working dur- 
ing "spare" time (for others it would be another aspect of their 
paid employment), both to prepare their cases, ( 4 / 5  weeks was 
considered an unreasonably short time) and to attend the 
Inquiry (with a potential loss of earnings over the Inquiry 
period). At their requ-est, a postponement of two weeks was 
granted in order to allow more time for their. case to be 
prepared including their assimilation of the Cremer and Warner 
report:  a further postponement, though requested, was not 
granted (such postponements a re  granted a t  the discretion of 
the Reporter). 
During the Inquiry proceedings time again exerted an influence in 
constraining the contribution of parties, notably in terms of adequately 
digesting arguments of others .  Again the Action Group would claim their 
disadvantage in this respect  to be greater  than tha t  of their more experi- 
enced opponents. 
The Action Group were not alone in considering time constraints inhi- 
biting. The Health and Safety Executive remarked tha t  they had  also only 
had the  statutory time limit in which to assemble their case. The objec- 
tions of Lothan  Regional Council (see Section 4.9) were also beaten by 
time. 
3. Additional evidence that may come to light after the Inquiry 
need not be considered as  relevant by the decision taker .  More- 
over, it would have been improper for other parties (particularly 
statutory authorities), even if they had  wanted to,  to openly 
debate such  evidence as  may have arisen. There is undoubtedly 
some ambiguity a s  t o  what is and what is not "relevant" or  "addi- 
tional" and it is for the decision taking authority to decide. The 
radio sparks issue was considered relevant. Other evidence sub- 
mitted by the Action Group (see Section 5.5) was considered by 
the Secretary of State  to be of a kind that  already had been 
covered a t  t he  Inquiry. The irony is tha t  the radio sparks issue 
(whch  was considered a t  length) was considered by other  main 
parties, notably the Health and Safety Executive, to  be signifi- 
cantly less important than other  evidence (which was not) 
raised following the Inquiry. This aspect  further fueled the frus- 
tration and disquiet of the  Action Group. The following aspects 
hghlighted the Group's concern. 
(a) During consideration of the radio-sparks issue ( a  dialogue 
essentially between the Action Group and the Health and 
Safety Executive) the Action Group were given weeks and 
the Health and Safety Executive months to respond in suc- 
cessive rounds of correspondence. This was considered . 
both unreasonable and impractical. 
(b) The Shpping Hazards report prepared by the Action Group 
could not have been submitted t o  the Inquiry a s  the Canvey 
report  on  w h c h  it was based. had not been released by then. 
Their calculations of a risk to  the Aberdour and Dal- 
gety Bay communities (see Table 4.2) is plainly a t  variance 
with. the "accepted" 1 .0 -~  risk level agreed by other parties 
a t  the Public Inquiry, yet there  was no machinery whereby 
official response and open dialogue about this could take  
place (as  it w-as not judged by the Secretary of State  to  be 
new inforrnati.on relevant to the decision). 
The Action Group's protests were directed to different statutory 
authorities at  different stages in the decision process: initially 
until January 1977, to the local authorities; subsequently (follow- 
ing the "call-in"), to the Scottish Development Department; later 
(the Public Inquiry onwards) to the Health and Safety Executive. 
Again, the Action Group were not alone in complaining of post-Inquiry 
timing of events. The oil companies made the point that although all par- 
ties to the decision had a strictly limited time in which to respond to 
given asp'ects, or make representations on others, the Secretary of State 
could (and apparently did) give himself unlimited time. 
6.3. THE DELAY 
For a project of this scale, six months would be a reasonable time lag 
between Public Inquiry and decision (though much would depend upon 
the length of time needed to prepare the Inquiry report). The time lag in 
fact turned out to be over two years. At the Public Inquiry, time was said 
to be important by both Shell and Esso. Shell in particular were said to 
have a contract to deliver gas to the British Gas Corporation by October 
1980 at  the latest,  and to deliver propane and butane to Northern Liquid 
Fuels (North America) by 1981. Moreover, the official government policy 
statement (see section 3.2) noted the importance of an early decision and 
the need to have the plants built and commissioned by 1960. A decision 
had been expected by December 1977. The activities of the two main par- 
ties involved in the delay have been reviewed above. In t h s  section, party 
perspectives on some strategic aspects of the delay and its associated 
uncertainty are summarized. 
(1) It was almost inevitable that rumors that the oil companies 
might abandon their plans for Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay would 
arise during the delay. No substance appears to have emerged 
to support press rumors or the Action Group's ultimate hop -. on 
t h s  count. The local authorities and Scottish Development 
Department appeared unperturbed, as it was their firm belief 
that Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay was the most (only?) suitable site 
for the proposed developments and the costs to the companies 
of starting afresh elsewhere were considered less attractive 
than the option of awaiting a final decision. 
(2) From the perspective of nalional government, the uncertainty 
generated by the delay could have been significant. As 
remarked above, a delay such as was seen will have done little to 
improve the UK's reputation for encouraging the ostablishnlent 
of petro-chemical industry based on North Sea resources. 
(3) It has been indicated that  potential downstream industrial 
developers had shown interest in the Mossmorran site during 
the post-lnquiry period, but the interest had not been silstained 
because planning permission had not at the time been available, 
and there was not even any clear indication when. the decision 
would be taken. 
(4) A further effect of the delay, of possible concern to the oil com- 
panies, has been to reduce their lead time over other gas pro- 
cessing schemes that had more recently been proposed (includ- 
ing plans for Nigg Bay and Peterhead). This might be potentially 
important in view of the degree of overlap both in construction 
requirement for plant, and in end-markets for final products 
(propane, butane and ethylene). 
(5) Various individuals (notably some local authority councillors and 
members of parliament in Westminster) volunteered their own 
costings of the delay in terms of North Sea resources and reve- 
nues foregone. Their statement, however, do not appear to have 
found any support from industry. It was claimed (by the 
former) tha t  the reinjection of gas condensate in Brent will have 
reduced the total ultimate recoverable output; this had also 
been suggested by the oil companies a t  the Public Inquiry. The 
latter have more recently said, however, that  it is not possible to 
determine whether reinjection will adversely affect ultimate 
rates of recovery; indeed, it would be conceivable for this to 
improve them. The other significant consideration in this 
respect is whether oil is worth more if sold today or left in the 
ground to appreciate in value for a number of years--a famous 
old chestnut and fertile ground for economic debate; compli- 
cated more than usual in this case by fluctuating world prices 
for propane, butane, and ethylene. It would appear, theref ore, 
that the direct monetary cost to the nation of the delay cannot 
be easily estimated, despite various attempts to do so. 
(6) The local authorities were dissatisfied about the delay, but they 
could do nothing to curtail i t .  No purpose would have been 
served by open criticism at  the time, though more recently the 
P1annin.g Director of one of the local authority's has voiced criti- 
cism of the handling of the delay by the Scottish Development 
Department. They suffered no significant loss from the delay, 
given that  the eventual decision was one of approval (they do not 
appear to have been aware of point (3) above) but were frus- 
trated at the "sitting back and waiting" during the long time lag 
before the decision, particularly in view of their intensive 
activity before the Public Inquiry. 
(7) Hindsight may suggest that withdrawal from Peterhead had not 
been in the best interest of the nation or of the oil companies. 
Ths  is strongly refuted by the latter because it could never be 
guaranteed that the necessary alterations to the harbor could 
be carried out successfully--possible freak weather conditions at 
a crucial stage in construction, was the critical con-sideration in 
ruling out possible harbor modifications. 
6.4. SlTE CHOICE 
As noted above, the statutory decision procedures are not set in 
train until a company intending to see a particular site developed for a 
particular purpose lodge an official planning application for the intended 
site. This pre-determination of site choice is viewed quite differently by 
different parties. 
The oil companies priority is to satisfy themselves as to the suitabil- 
ity of a particular site. This is likely to include private appraisal of possi- 
ble alternatives, but does not argue for open (and expensive) interparty 
debate on them. 
The Scottish Development Department issue guidelines for the siting 
of petro-chemical developments (see Figure 2.4), but consider it inap- 
propriate to remove the siting initiative and choice of "best" site from 
industry. Thus their siting criteria are  based on "satisfying" rather than 
"optimizing." 
The Forth Port Authority's review of alternative sites in the Forth has 
already been noted (section 4.6). 
The Health and Safety Executive undertook to give a provisional judg- 
ment in principle on sites chosen by industry for development. They do 
not, and do not consider it practicable to, issue siting guidelines for com- 
plex petro-chemical installations: siting guidelines may be issued in the 
near future for simple gas storage facilities only. 
Although some individuals within the Fife local authorities admitted 
that  a multi-site decision process might be more publicly accountable, 
they were well pleased that Mossmorran had been chosen, and were not 
inclined to suggest that other possible alternatives shou.ld be considered. 
The Action Group's view was that  an objective choice of site could not 
be made by the oil companies alone. There is no a priori reason why com- 
pany, national and local interests should coincide in. this respect (an 
argument which has ample precedent). They were particularly dissatis- 
fied about the refusal of the Scottish Development Department to discuss 
possible alternative sites a t  an early stage in the decision process (Edin- 
burgh News 24.4.1977). Moreover, they accused the oil companies of 
backtracking on earlier stated advantages of Peterhead in their argu- 
ments about the advantages of Mossmorran (notably the former site's 
proximity to St.  Fergus), and were unconvinced that a remoter site 
further north in Scotland was unfeasible. 
6.5. APPROPRIATENESS OF STATUTORY PROCEDURES 
In questioning the appropriateness of the s tatutory procedures 
under w h c h  the decision was taken,  parties were asking for 
(a) a more efficient procedure (and, since t h e  radio-sparks issue 
caused the greatest  delay, a quicker way of settling it); 
(b) a more accountable decision procedure, a call mainly (though 
not exclusively) from the Action Group. 
The key legislation involved was the Town and Country Planning 
(Scotland) Act 1972. The suitability of t h s  deserves consideration since 
this single ac t  is intended to  cover any development of land (from home 
extensions to  petro-chemical complexes), bIoreover, the Mossmorran- 
Braefoot Bay plans were of a scale and scope tha t  the District Coilncils 
involved had never before had to  deal with. An oil company representative 
suggested tha t  from h s  point of view a specific Act or Commission of 
Inquiry for a decision on a development of this scale may have been more 
appropriate; this would be a radical departure from UK practice and  can- 
not be readily evaluated: t he  Roskill Commission on the Third London Air- 
port is the closest analogy (but  not necessarily a good example to follow). 
The Action Group questioned the suitability of the 1972 Act on other 
grounds, namely tha t  it enabled planning permission to  be granted for a 
development for which very few specific design details were available, 
with the concurrent severe limitation on  the depth to  which various issues 
could be brought out (as  reviewed in section 6.2.). 
Both the Action Group and the Health and Safety Executive ( a t  dif- 
ferent times) questioned the suitability of the Public Inquiry for hand]-ing 
issues of public safety. The t e rms  of reference of the Inquiry were ill 
defined in this respect ;  neither party could define what the Public Inquiry 
was supposed to  a c h e v e ,  but  both had very different 'expectations. 
Adversarial communication between parties a t  the Public Inquiry was in 
any case considered to  be hardly the best way of investigating issues of 
public safety. 
The Action Group were to  point out (February 1977 and a t  various 
times subsequenLly) tha t  the inadequacy of the local Public Inquiry had 
been recognized by parliament many years previously when a new pro- 
cedure, the Planning lnquiry Commission, was introduced into the s ta tu te  
books (see under sections 44 to  46 of the 1972 Act). 'This was intended to 
deal with projects w h c h  involved highly technical or scientific aspects  or 
raised considerations of national importance or required a detailed con- 
sideration of alternative sites. These a re  all aspects  which it was recog- 
nized could not be evaluated a t  the local Public Inquiry, except in  a most 
superficial manner.  The Planning Inquiry Commission would be composed 
of between three and five suitably qualified persons with adequate 
resources and powers t o  car ry  out an  in-depth s tudy and to  call for any 
necessary specialized research or advice. It wou.ld involve a two stage 
process, the first consisting of a public hearing a t  which the issues would 
be established, and any necessary analyses commissioned or undertaken. 
The second. consi.sting of a hearing a t  which formal debate  of the issues 
and resulting written analyses could occur.  The Planning lnquiry 
Commission has never been used (see Department ol Environment 1978, 
for reasons). 
The Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay developments were, in the opinion of 
the Action Group, ideal candidates for a Planning Inquiry Commission. 
However, 
"The Secretary of State considers that it was possible through 
the inquiry and the subsequent exchanges to obtain all the evi- 
dence needed for a full and proper assessment of the applica- 
tions lodged by the developers and he cannot therefore see any 
justification for a Planning Inquiry Commission in the cir- 
cumstances of these proposals." 
Given the perceived deficiencies of the Public Inquiry for a project 
such as Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, views expressed towards it from 
members of the Action Group included "a farce," "a mockery," "a token 
gesture to democracy." Having been denied a Planning Inquiry Commis- 
sion they considered it essential to participate in the Public Inquiry as it 
was their only possible chance of making their views known. 
The Action Group were not alone in calling for a Planning Inquiry 
Commission; the Conservation Society and the (labour) M.P. for Dunferm- 
line were also to lodge an  official request. Some members of the local 
authorities were sympathetic to the suggestion, as i t  would have clarified 
the terms of reference of the (equivalent of the) Public Inquiry and would 
have increased the accountability of the decision process There were 
differences of opinion within the local authorities about whether or not 
the decision process as a whole would have consequently been more or 
less protracted. The local authorities did not consider themselves the 
appropriate party to ask for a Planning Inquiry Commission; their views in 
th.is respect were not uniformly or strongly held. 
6.6. RESOURCES 
The resources available to different parties were varied, and it is 
important to assess what resource constraints may have existed. Time as 
a resource constraint has already been reviewed (section 6.2).  Other 
resources include expertise, finance and information. The Action Group 
would claim themselves to be the main party adversely affected in this 
respect (as  an ad hoc group i t  might be argued that this is rightly so). 
Although the local authorities considered it necessary, lacking their own 
internal expertise, to commission (at a cost of 45,000 pounds stg.) private 
independent consultants to advise on hazard there was no suggestion of 
severe resource constraints on their own decision involvement. 
In addition to their dissatisfaction on timing (see above) opinions 
expressed by the Action Group suggested the following resource con- 
straints: 
(1) technical expertise--although it my have been out of choice to 
call on their own experts (rather than, say, Friends of the Earth, 
or other outsiders), they would not have been able to pay the 
fees of professional consultants anyway; 
( 2 )  their financial resources were severely limited (local door to 
door collections and ad hoc fund raising activities), particularly 
when compared to those of all other main parties. The cost of 
their campaign up to the stage of the final Court Appeal was 
approximately 12,000 pounds stg., raised in the early stages by 
appeals to the local community, and later by jumble sales, cof- 
fee mornings and sale of works. 
(3) their relative lack of familiarity with Public Inquiry procedures. 
Participation a t  Public Inquiries is an  education in itself; since 
they are "one-off" events, however, it may be too late for ama- 
teur participants to put any lessons learned into practice. 
(4) availability of information as a constraint on participation has 
'been. referred to above (section 6.2);  the Action Group were to 
complain repeatedly that they were being denied information 
necessary for their cause; the most notable illustration of this 
aspect arose in June 1978 when court proceedings were (suc- 
cessfully) brought by the Action Group against the Scottish 
Development Department in order to obtain certain information 
(the Excel1 report). 
6.7. THE DECISION OUTCOME 
The decision outcome (approval, August 1979) met the interests of all 
main parties except the Action Group. Perspectives offered by other 
main parties on the Action Gr-oup's position in t h s  respect range between 
the following extremes: 
(a) parties will accept decisions that are unfavorable to them pro- 
vided that they have been arrived a t  by procedures that can be 
seen to be fair; 
(b) parties will inevitably be dissatisfied with decisions that are 
unfavorable to them. 
The Action Group was immensely dissatisfied and bitter not only with 
the decision outcome, but also with the procedure by which it had been 
arrived at .  Their campaign did not end with the announcement of the 
decision. Later that year (September 1979) they lodged an appeal at  the 
Court of Session in Edinburgh against the decision, which was heard the 
following February but was unsuccessful. Shell awaited thi.s court judg- 
ment before commencing site clearance and plant construction. A 
further possible appeal by the Action Group to the 1-Iouse of Lords and to 
the European Court of Human Rights was not pursued; the financial 
penalty of an unsuccessful appeal was a crucial consideration, having 
been faced with costs of 900 pounds stg. from their first appeal against 
the Secretary of State ( a  sum larger than anticipated because it had not 
been expected that Shell/Esso would have been parties to the appeal). 
6.8. PLANNING CONDITIONS* 
Forty-eight planning conditions were attached to the planning per- 
mission given by the Secretary of State for the NGL plant with a similar 
set  for the ethylene cracker. The most important of these as regards 
hazard and safety considerations are those numbered (1) and (3) which 
were repeated in section 5.6. 
The local authorities had suggested a condition similar to (1) a t  and 
before the Public Inquiry, following a recommendation by Cremer and 
Warner (the audit to be to the Council's satisfaction). The Inquiry 
Reporter on the other hand recommended the audit to be to the satisfac- 
tion of the Health and Safety Executive. The Secretary of State decided 
that  it must also be to his own satisfaction. 
The conditions, however, fell hopelessly short of what the Action 
Group considered was required. They pointed out (Mehta 1980) that there 
was no definition in condition (1) above of what the audit is, what form it 
will take, who will carry it out to ensure its independence and, above all, 
what standards are to be satisfied. The whole concept of a safety audit 
that  is not carried out until after the plant is built a t  a cost of several 
hundred million pounds of both public and private capital was considered 
to be absurd. Moreover, i t  appeared that  shipping--the most likely source 
of a disastrous accident--was not covered. (The Health and Safety Execu- 
tive, who advised that this condition be included, have since said (private 
communication) that  shipping is to be included). 
Condition (3) was considered unsatisfactory as  it pre-empted the 
whole question of what electro-magnetic field strengths and levels of 
power induced in site structures might be,  and .whether effective steps 
can be taken to prevent dangerous levels. It also pre-supposed that naval 
traffic in the  Forth could be compelled not to use certain frequencies of 
transmissions for fear of creating break sparks. 
A more general grievance about the planning conditions was that 
they were so vague that  it was extremely doubtful if they could in law be 
enforced in the event of any disagreement. 
Other parties expressed no slgnificanl criticism about the planning 
conditions, and indeed were generally more than satisfied with them. 
'It has been pointed out tha t  no mention is made here, nor elsewhere in the present :report, 
of the agreem.ent between District Councils and Shell and Esso about these conditions and 
other matters unsui~able for treatment under planning conditions. Heads of agreement were 
signed between Districts and Shell and Esso a t  the  time of the Public Inquiry. Section 50 
Agreements with both subsequent:ly entered into (Section 50 of Town and Country Planning 
(Scotland) Act, 1972). 
CHAPTER 7: 
EVALUATION 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
With the inevitable benefit of hindsight it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the decision outcome was never in serious doubt. There 
may have been some refinement in the detail of planning conditions to be 
stipulated, but there seemed little likelihood on the evidence available 
(i.e., assuming no significant "unseen" factor), given the well-defined one- 
sited nature of the decision process, that approval would be refused or 
that planning conditions would be unduly restrictive. There were eventu- 
ally forty eight planning conditions for the NGL plant and an almost ident- 
ical set for the ethane cracker, the most significant of whch  as regards 
safety assurances being that a full hazard and operabi-lity audit should be 
undertaken to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State before the NGL 
plant and ethane cracker could each be commissioned. 
There appears to have been early forward momentum towards a deci- 
sion of approval on the part of statutory authorities involved (local 
authorities, Scottish Development Department, Department of Energy) 
and firm interest by the oil companies, which appears to have been little 
shaken by the relatively long delay over the radio sparks issue. There 
were few rights of appeal by the objectors on the final decision. Although 
benefits stressed by advocates of the plant were tangible economic 
aspects, both local and national--jobs, income, revenues--image and pres- 
tige rather than explicit evaluation of these more tangible aspects are 
likely to have carried considerable weight. At a local level, authorities 
seem bound in principle to approve the establishment of large prestigious 
relatively permanent industry in otherwise depressed areas (they would 
have a hard time arguing otherwise to their electorate). At the national 
level, credibility and prestige rather than export or royalty revenues, 
were probably the strongest of the national interest arguments that even- 
tually counted. Some exceptional evidence on hazard would have had to 
emerge--in a different league than anything that in fact came to light--to 
have warranted refusal of the application. 
Notwithstanding any inevitability in the decision outcome, the deci- 
sion itself imposed a judgment over three classic fields of conflict: 
(1) a conflict over dimensions--health and safety "costs" and 
economic "benefits"; 
(2) a conflict between different levels of spatial resolution--local, 
regional, national; 
(3) a conflict between party self interests-private industry, the 
public sector, the public. 
In the remainer of this chapter, a number of observations relating to 
heath and safety aspects of the Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay decision will be 
offered against the background set  by these conflicts. 
7.2. PARTY EVALUATIONS OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY DIMENSION 
Two themes underly the observations made in t h s  section: 
(a) that risks were evaluated differently by different parties, for a 
number of reasons including perception, knowledge, presence or 
absence of associated benefits (real and/or strategic), spatial 
proximity to the source of hazard; 
(b) that different parties had different pre-conceptions about what 
was supposedly being established during the decision process as 
regards health and safety. 
From the premise that the most acceptable risk is one that is unk- 
nown, the Cowdenbeath population may have deemed risks to be accept- 
able because they were ignorant of them. (A judgment of doubtful merit, 
though whether others should step in to attempt to dispel such ignorance 
is equally doubtful.) 
Knowledge of risks depends on technical expertise applied to the 
particular characteristics of a given facility, and this in turn is one (but 
by no means the only) consideration for defining thresholds of acceptabil- 
ity. Allowing for the sake of argument, that the experts of the supporter 
groups and objectors group had comparable levels of technical expertise, 
then one of the main discrepancies between the two factions who were 
aware of potential risks was that  the former considered qualitative judg- 
ment sufficient whereas the latter called for an explicit quantitative 
assessment at  the planning application stage. 
The Action Group argued that  quantification was the only meaningful 
way of relating to any absolute yardstick of risk acceptability, whether it 
be a residual risk of one in a million in any given year, or some other 
level. Although most parties referred at  some stage to t h s  tablet of 
stone, the Action Group were sceptical in accepting other parties' 
foundations for doing so, given that no quantitative assessment had been 
performed. An explanation that  the qualitative criteria implicitly adopted 
would themselves ensure a lo-' (or better) result was not in itself con- 
sidered adequate explanation for not performing a quantitative assess- 
ment. It was hardly more reassuring to point to the paucity of the data 
base on which a quantitative assessment could draw, and thus the lack of 
confidence that could be placed in any results obtained, or alternatively 
to the possibility of manufacturing a quantitative risk assessment to given 
any desired final result--10-~, lo-', lo-', 10-12, or whatever. This in turn 
raises the question of the level of confidence that can be put in the quali- 
tative assessment that was produced. Alternatively, it could have been 
more directly asserted that the decision process was not the place to 
establish rigorously the acceptability (or otherwise) of the safety of the 
proposed installation. Thus the observation remains that  the absence of a 
quantitative assessment, related to the level of the design detail available, 
restricted the depth to  which safety criteria could be explored during the 
decision process, and the nature of the arguments that  could be brought 
to bear. 
The presence or absence of associated benefits may affect personal 
evaluation of risk acceptability. A lower threshold of risk acceptability 
may be tolerated if no direct benefits are foreseen, thus providing further 
possible explanation for the views of the local authorities, the population 
of Cowdenbeath and the Secretary of State (all perceiving direct 
economic benefits) against those of the Action Group (standing to gain no 
such benefits). It would be foolhardy to suggest that  a deliberate trade- 
off was being made by the former parties. However, since all parties 
admitted to a residual risk (agreeing that there is no such thing as abso- 
lute safety) there may be an unavoidable built-in trade-off here, given 
that  the raison d 'etre of the plant is economic. 
The spatial proximity to the source of potential hazard also affects 
personal evaluation of risk acceptability, and. here again there is a strik- 
ing contrast between the people of Cowdenbeath and those of Aberdour 
and Dalgety Bay. These are the communities potentially most at  risk 
from the developments and the massive opposition from the latter cannot 
be explained entirely in terms of the relative physical hazard potential in 
each location (though a case could be made here), but rather in terms of 
socio-economic make-up--un and semi-skilled working class vs. articulate 
and educated middle class respectively. The following statement from 
the Cremer and Warner Report (1977) raises but leaves unresolved some 
interesting and difficult questions: "The criteria of acceptability of risk 
must be set  by the community a t  risk and not handed down to them as 
technical statern.ents." 
It suggests firstly that there are bound to be winners and losers from 
such a decision process; in the event, the Action Group fought against the 
plant (on grounds of safety) and lost; Cowdenbeath would have been bitter 
had they won and the plant consequently sited elsewhere. Thus the com- 
munity a t  risk cannot be left to judge acceptability, because different 
sections of the community come up with different answers. An equally 
important observation is that the communities of Aberdour and Dalgety 
Bay are too small to have a voi.ce on th.e statutory decision making bodies, 
notably the local councils. Such minorities have to accept the decision of 

































